



Daily Report

East Europe

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Czech, Slovak Prime Ministers on Prague Talks

LD1201140794 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 12 Jan 94

[Text] A few minutes ago we received from Prague a recording of statements made by [Slovak] Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and [Czech] Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus on the results of their talks today. Here are they in their full length version.

[Begin recording] [Meciar] The meeting between the delegations of the Slovak and Czech Governments have just finished. The delegations were led by us, the two prime ministers.

During this meeting, we told the Czech Government our stance on the cooperation within Visegrad Four, as well as on some other critical statements made recently, especially in Poland. I would like to stress that the Government of the Slovak Republic considers all the steps taken by the Czech Republic in order to protect its political and security interests to be fully legitimate. The criticism was one-sided, and simplified matters, and we do not identify ourselves with this criticism. In this respect, we express our full support for the steps taken by the Government of the Czech Republic to defend its own interests.

We have analyzed issues related to the Partnership for Peace. We agreed that (our) stance is approximately identical. The Slovak side accepts this initiative without any reservations.

We have also dealt with issues concerning the agreements we had concluded in years 1992 and 1993 and the fulfillment of the obligations ensuing from them. By coincidence, in two weeks, it will be one year ago that, in the very same room, we were working on the currency division. It seems that the system which was set up is [word indistinct]. A meeting of the representatives of the customs union will take place this week, the interior ministers will meet to discuss borders.

We have also debated the improvement of economic cooperation. In this area, the interest of both sides on the priorities we have is fully legitimate. In 1994 we shall continue to support the economic cooperation in 1994 as well as in the next period.

These, approximately, were the main topics that we dwelt on during our talks.

[Klaus] Thank you very much. I really agree with this information on our meeting. I would like to underline three issues.

First, I expressed to the Slovak side and the Slovak Government an appreciation for a hundred-percent observation of the agreements that we had concluded between the Czech and Slovak Republics, especially for the immediate settlement of the debt on the clearing account. We consider this to be a very good signal and a sign that the pessimists who foresaw a deterioration in

cooperation in all the areas between our countries are wrong. We are very pleased that this happened the way it did, and I would like to underline it here.

Second, we talked about the Partnership for Peace, to be more exact, about our very, very close if not identical views.

Third, we talked about the very close views on the cooperation between the countries of the so-called Visegrad Four. I think that both sides are well aware that we are painstakingly seeking to find the highest common denominator in the views of these four countries. The fact that we are not able to do everything as a foursome is in no way caused by any individuals on this or the other side but by the real interests of these countries. [end recording]

Slovak Leaders Answer Questions on Summit

LD1201210294 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 12 Jan 94

[Text] Representatives of the Slovak delegation to the Prague summit gave a news conference in the Hotel Praha at 1600 hours. Jarmila Tosecka, our reporter, was there and she compiled the following report.

[Begin recording] [Tosecka] Questions put by many journalists, including foreign ones, were answered by President Michal Kovac, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik, and Defense Minister Imrich Andrejcek.

These questions could be summed up in the following basic areas: prospects for the future cooperation among the Visegrad four countries, the importance of the Partnership for Peace project for the countries involved and specifically for the Slovak Republic, Slovakia's relations with Hungary, the problem of the Hungarian minority as well as Slovak relations with Russia, and future contacts between Slovakia and the Czech Republic.

In reply, Prime Minister Meciar again confirmed closeness of views whether on the project "Partnership for Peace" where, as the Czech side, Slovakia regarded individual approach as being realistic. He also assessed positively other areas of mutual relations. According to Meciar, Slovakia was interested in good and useful cooperation among the Visegrad four countries, but the existing course and results were not as we have expected. It is necessary to intensify cooperation, otherwise this group would disintegrate only to be replaced by bilateral relations.

Asked whether a visit to Bratislava by President Clinton was discussed, President Michal Kovac replied: Yes, we have repeated our invitation to the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Slovak national uprising. We have presented to the U.S. President an album containing documentary evidence. Bill Clinton promised that if he himself could not come he would certainly send his envoy to Bratislava.

Minister Jozef Moravcik confirmed, among other things, that the Slovak Republic was ready to sign immediately a framework agreement on Partnership for Peace. This was also confirmed by Defense Minister Imrich Andrejcek. Foreign Minister Moravcik also replied to questions concerning the minorities problem. After the news conference ended, I put to him the following question: Before the Prague summit, the Hungarian daily NEPSZ-ABADSZAG said the meeting in Komarno of Hungarian minority representatives last Saturday was taking place in the shadow of the Prague summit. At the same time it cast a shadow on that summit. During your talks with your Hungarian partner, could you also detect this shadow?

[Moravcik] In my view, one should not overestimate the importance of that event. In a democratic environment, it is on the whole usual that somewhat more extreme views are presented. We appreciate the way that event

passed off, the fact no anti-constitutional step was taken, and that everything is a subject of discussion [passage indistinct].

[Tosecka] How would you characterize your talks today with the Hungarian side?

[Moravcik] The talks were of a general character, as we had little time. Problems raised were rather numerous. There was not enough time to enable us to devote ourselves to individual questions. Both sides, however, demonstrated strong political will to reach a consensus very quickly so that we would not have to spend too much energy on tackling certain problems and instead concentrate rather on issues tackled here.

[Tosecka] As a government representative, how would you assess the conclusions of this Prague summit. What does it mean for Slovakia?

[Moravcik] For Slovakia it means opportunity, and one has to make use of that opportunity. [end recording]

Ukraine Asked To Return 'Extra' Centrel Energy

*AU1301182394 Paris AFP in English 1434 GMT
13 Jan 94*

[Text] Budapest, Jan 13 (AFP)—Central European countries asked Ukraine to return 200 million kilowatt-hours of extra electric energy it drew from their joint Centrel electric system, the head of the Hungarian national electricity distributor, Antal Tombor, said Thursday.

The unplanned Ukrainian electric energy imports, which started in November after the energy supply situation within Ukraine became critical, "caused economic damage to consumers belonging to the system", Tombor told the VILAGGAZDASAG economic daily.

Electricity suppliers in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Romania, Hungary and the eastern part of Germany set a January 21 deadline for Ukraine to return

the extra energy, drawn after these states' grids were separated from the Russian and Ukraine-Bulgarian electricity grids in November.

Hungary supplied a quarter of the extra energy to Ukraine but practically all other central European states were affected by the unplanned draws, which caused "considerable frequency fluctuation" in the Centrel system, Tombor said. He added however that Hungary had not had to introduce any consumption restrictions due to the extra Ukrainian consumption, but electric appliances here slowed down and were overstrained.

Currently, only a 400- and a 200-kilovolt electric conductor is in use between Hungary and Ukraine after the main 750-kilovolt line went out of use in November. The central grid is to be reconnected with the Russian and Ukrainian electricity grids after mid-May, he said.

Zhelev Hoping for 'Influx' of U.S. Investment*AU1301190394 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 13 Jan 94**[Report by Silviya Velikova]*

[Text] Today Madeleine Albright, U.S. permanent representative at the United Nations, who arrived in Bulgaria today, was received, respectively, by President of the Republic Zhelyu Zhelev and Prime Minister Lyuben Berov. Ms. Albright briefed them on the U.S. Partnership for Peace Initiative, which has already been adopted by NATO.

Ms. Albright expressed the U.S. expectation that Bulgaria will also be one of the East European states to join in this initiative. Ms. Albright voiced the U.S. Administration's willingness to continue to provide economic assistance to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. According to her, the financing of infrastructure projects, mainly in the transportation and communications fields, will be of particular importance for Bulgaria.

Dr. Zhelev confirmed his insistent invitation to President Bill Clinton to visit Bulgaria.

At both meetings, discussions were held on Yugoslav crisis issues and the sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro. President Zhelev expressed the view that certain indirect measures are already in hand to alleviate the losses that Bulgaria is suffering from observing the Yugoslav embargo, but we hope to obtain even better trade possibilities with the United States and to see an influx of new U.S. investments into Bulgaria.

Zhelev, Albright Discuss Partnership for Peace*AU1301164894 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 13 Jan 93*

[Text] Today Ms. Madeleine Albright, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, had a meeting with President Zhelev that lasted longer than planned. The subject of discussion at the meeting was the U.S. Partnership for Peace Initiative, which has already become a NATO initiative.

Ms. Albright delivered to President Zhelev a special letter on behalf of U.S. President Bill Clinton that acquainted the president with the general nature of the initiative.

On behalf of Bulgaria, President Zhelev stressed our country's readiness to join in this initiative. They also discussed the situation in the Balkans and the nature of the bilateral relations between Bulgaria and the United States.

At this moment, Ms. Albright is having talks with Prime Minister Professor Lyuben Berov.

Defense Ministry Denies Differences With Zhelev*AU1301181494 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 13 Jan 94*

[Text] There are no differences regarding military policy between the leaderships of the Defense Ministry and the Armed Forces and the President of the Republic, Dr. Zhelev. This is the official stance of the Defense Ministry, which was announced at the Ministry's regular news conference held in Sofia today, in connection with certain reports in the press regarding the president's decree on setting up a military office.

Tsvyatko Donchev, chief of the Defense Ministry Press Service, once again confirmed Defense Minister Aleksandrov's categorical refusal to comment on the letter published in the 24 CHASA daily.

French Official Signs Deal To Update Kozloduy*AU1301182194 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 13 Jan 94*

[Text] France will provide financial aid to update the Nos. 5 and 6 Power Generating Units at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. This is stated in the cooperation agreement signed today between Electricite de France, the Bulgarian Power Supply Committee, and the National Electrical Company. On the French side, the document was signed by Mr. Remy Carle [as heard], deputy director general of Electricite de France and chairman of the World Association of Nuclear Operators—WANO, who is paying an official visit to Bulgaria.

As already reported, yesterday Mr. Carle was in Kozloduy, where he familiarized himself with the work completed on restoring the Nos. 1 and 2 Reactor Units at the nuclear plant, which was also carried out with French assistance.

BSP Paper on Need for Dialogue With SDS*AU1301193094 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 8 Jan 94 p 16*

[Editorial commentary: "Test of Nerves"]

[Text] Zhan Videnov has shown that he already knows how to take risks. He went to 134 Rakovski Street [Union of Democratic Forces-SDS headquarters] to hear with his own ears, face to face, what the blue [SDS] leader thinks, and of course, in order to be heard himself. In a state with democratic traditions dialogue is the most direct way to the truth. Videnov was not confused and he selected that way. Regardless of how arrogantly Mr. Filip Dimitrov behaves, the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] has shown that it is a party of clear words. After all it was the BSP and no one else that initiated the famous roundtable four years ago. It was precisely this roundtable that confirmed that the BSP is not afraid of dialogue. In this context the visit to 134 Rakovski Street was not an incident or a casual whim. It is a part of a

deliberate course of behavior that has already helped up with our hesitant steps in democracy.

The reaction to Videnov's appearance at the SDS headquarters was not only stormy but also varied. Every interested politician is trying to view it, interpret it, and use it in accordance with his own interests. If you read DEMOKRATSIYA you can see how much speculation can be squeezed in one article, the irresponsible nature of which is evident not only regarding relations with the political opponent, but also regarding the SDS's own interest. If you read the declaration of the Civic Alliance for the Republic you will understand what certain political forces fear. It appears that the Bulgarian political arena is still not prepared for normal, albeit unexpected, meetings. Torn by suspicion, our society constantly seeks something sensational or secret, and that confuses it. Certain irresponsible journalists, who prefer fantasy to truth, contribute to this situation.

Unfortunately, Videnov's visit to the SDS headquarters, which lasted 90 minutes, created confusion in certain BSP circles. Responsible figures in the BSP regarded the visit as irresponsible. They tend to see the visit as a compromise serving the interests of the other side. This is wrong and it must worry us not only because it breeds suspicion, but also because it evokes alarm as a position. Already at the 14th Congress, which created the BSP, it was loftily declared that the BSP will be a party of dialogue, political contacts, pluralism, and cooperation in all issues of democratic development. Zhan Videnov was simply putting this statement into effect. He went to Filip Dimitrov not in order to make compromises or create intrigues, but to study the other side's position and express the BSP position on certain issues. Those issues are of national interest, and this relieves Videnov of any hesitation he might have had about the meeting. It is precisely in this element that those who were confused by the meeting could not grasp the scope of the political task, and they therefore became confused. What is amazing is that some of those who became confused have never declared their opposition to dialogue as the essence of socialist policy. On the contrary, they often themselves participated in contacts with different political forces.

Rejecting or not understanding Zhan Videnov's initiative is one of the many typical mistakes that certain people allow in their thinking. They often place their own political ambitions above the political interest, or what is worse, in principle they prefer confrontation to the complex but purposeful gambit. We have often been able to convince ourselves that confrontation builds up self-esteem, but it does not trace a new road. It might improve our self-esteem in our own eyes at a given moment, but it can never ensure our success. Indeed, the great drama of the SDS lies in its unwillingness to understand this simple truth. Why should we be the victims of the same mistake? The dialogue Zhan Videnov proposed to our political opponent does not undermine the BSP's prestige in any way. It only shows that the BSP is the calmer and wiser political force and that in

the name of the great public interest it is prepared to talk with everyone, even those who deliberately refuse to take our real name into consideration.

It is time for all those who formulate the BSP's policy to understand that a bold and unconventional move in relations with others is better than the traditional fear of surprises. Surprises are a part of the political "theater," and those who create or welcome them win points in the political game. Zhan Videnov's visit must be assessed on merit from this point of view. He did not go to the SDS headquarters to seek prestige, as DEMOKRATSIYA wrongly alleges, but to demonstrate prestige and to show our society that the BSP has no fear of expressing its opinion to anyone. This is more than useful at the beginning of the 1994 political season. Tomorrow Filip Dimitrov will find it much more difficult to cheat and maneuver, because he already knows what the Socialists think not only about the situation within the SDS itself, but also about the Presidency, the cabinet, the work of parliament, the budget, the Election Law, the future elections, the Supreme Judicial council, and many other issues that should be resolved soon. Things were expressed in a clear and open manner without any maneuvering. Speculating with the issue is harmful. If speculations nevertheless emerge, they will not change anything.

The BSP can be calm about the outcome of the meeting. It will not complicate its position in society in any way. On the contrary, it will only confirm its sober attitude toward all issues discussed. I will again stress that a policy of dialogue is better than a policy of covered cards. The purpose of the meeting was not to demand sacrifices from anyone, pressurize individual political forces, or preserve the status quo. It was a meeting for a typical exchange of information. Therefore, no one need imagine that there will be unexpected changes in the political landscape. The poles remain. Nevertheless, it is better for everyone that the poles hear each other before they engage in their regular parliamentary and extraparlimentary snowball fights. After all, sometimes such fights can be avoided for the sake of the common national tranquility.

This article could end here if the Presidency had not expressed its opinion. Like certain political leaders, Dr. Zhelev hastened to say that he did not like the meeting between Zhan Videnov and Filip Dimitrov, and that the meeting was prompted by some "severe crisis" in the BSP and the SDS. We cannot speak for the SDS, but on behalf of the BSP we must say that the president is alarmingly wrong, or is simply not aware of the realities, or is a victim of his own imagination. There are many things in the BSP, but no trace of a crisis. There are different opinions and assessments of issues, even ideological disputes, but for the time being at least there is nothing serious that could jeopardize the monolithic character of the party. It is and will certainly continue to be the biggest and strongest Bulgarian political party. As a former member of our party (and may the president forgive us for reminding him of this), Zhelyu Zhelev

knows very well that we, Socialists, have a sense of responsibility and duty even when we quarrel. We were not born yesterday and will not disappear tomorrow. Unlike his blue ideas, our ideas have roots and a future. Therefore, if he wants to be just, let him not confuse his wishful thinking with reality. Otherwise he will err, and his post is such that the smallest error could place him in a very uncomfortable situation. The BSP is a sufficiently mature party and knows precisely how to overcome its own weaknesses. Therefore, the crisis the president invokes is not in the BSP, but somewhere else. Perhaps somewhere near him, but let us not pursue this. The gentleman is smart enough to answer this for himself.

And so an absolutely normal dialogue between two political forces is causing serious excitement in Bulgaria. This is at once wonderful and alarming. It shows that society has great expectations, but its nerves are rather weak. We still have not achieved the psychological balance we need. Suspicion still is stronger than confidence. However, let us not despair. We need time. Many more meetings and talks are necessary for us to realize that it is better to talk to each other than pass each other like deaf people. In this sense Zhan Videnov has DUMA's support, as well as the support of all those who regard his political initiative as positive.

Army To Dismantle SS-23 Missiles Before 1996

*AU1301190294 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
10 Jan 94 p 3*

[Article by "(per)": "The Czech Army's SS-23 Missiles Will Be Dismantled Within Three Years"]

[Text] Prague—The SS-23 surface-to-surface missiles that the Czech Army took over from the former Federal Army will be withdrawn from its ordnance and dismantled before 1996. This is apparent from the information made available to RUDE PRAVO by Z. Borkovec, press spokesman for the Defense Ministry. He refused to reply to questions on how many missiles there are on our territory and where they will be dismantled. We found out from other sources that the Research and Testing Institute in Slavcin has looked into dismantling the missiles, and their actual dismantling should be carried out by the military unit in Bohuslavice nad Vlari near Zlin. According to Borkovec, the metal parts of the

missiles will be scrapped following their removal, and the Army will offer the chemical compounds to select organizations for further evaluation or ecological elimination.

Food Imports Adding to Slovakia Trade Deficit

*LD1301145094 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in
Czech 1100 GMT 13 Jan 94*

[Text] Food imports from the Czech Republic have added at least 1 billion korunas to Slovakia's deficit in the balance of payments with the Czech Republic.

According to Milan Filo, director of the Department of Trade at the Slovak Ministry of Agriculture, such imports are the result of the surviving federal structure of agriculture, which concentrates final food production in the Czech Republic. Among the main produce still imported by Slovakia are poultry, dairy and bakery products, margarine, spirits, and tobacco.

Meciar Comments on 'Partnership' Proposal

*LD1301135094 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 13 Jan 94*

[Excerpt] Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik met journalists in Bratislava today. The prime minister first briefly assessed the Prague talks. We have chosen the following essential part of his remarks:

[Begin Meciar recording] We assume that, in connection with the Partnership for Peace, neither the United States nor NATO countries are trying to create any new division line in Europe. This is an opportunity and a chance for all.

NATO membership is a matter of extraordinary responsibility, a matter of further development. The Partnership for Peace does not guarantee direct [NATO] membership, but gives a chance to take part in preparations for it.

We see and understand that the Partnership for Peace is a big step forward. The Slovak Republic is an active member of the North Atlantic Committee for Cooperation, and, within this institution, it became a member of several of its bodies.

The Partnership for Peace means a qualitatively new contribution to security in Central and East Europe and is qualitatively different from the present incorporation into the North Atlantic Committee for Cooperation. The Partnership for Peace contains both political and military aspects. It envisages joint military exercises, training, intervention, modeling future relationships, and membership in NATO.

The Partnership for Peace is not an automatic guarantee of security. However, it envisages the possibility of consultation with other countries in the event of a military threat.

The declaration from Brussels is also important to us. It is namely a declaration that NATO expects and welcomes as its future members countries neighboring it in the East. This is a new element, and, on the basis of this stance, the talk is no longer about a yes or a no for membership; the talk is only about when and how. This is a marked qualitative shift forward.

A framework declaration concerning the sequence of steps needed to join the Partnership for Peace was adopted at the Brussels summit. We assume that those who subscribe to the Partnership for Peace will have to take on themselves the following pledges: First, they will pledge to observe the principles of democracy, human rights, and minorities' rights.

In Europe there are two alternative concepts concerning the rights of minorities, one being the concept pushed through by the Council of Europe and the other being the one pushed through by the Hungarian Republic, the latter being directed toward collective rights. President

Clinton and his entourage confirmed that the rights involved are individual human rights, as the [word indistinct] of collective rights as such is unacceptable. In this respect, this is exceptionally important international political support for the stance taken by the Government of the Slovak Republic.

Second, these countries must pledge that they will unconditionally accept the principle of the inviolability of borders.

The remaining topic of discussion for us is the southern border. We are holding talks with the Hungarian Government specifically about the adoption of this principle. Our position on this matter is thus reconfirmed and is advantageous to us.

The next thing envisaged is civilian control over the Army and the transparency of the military budget. NATO countries and the countries that will become members of the Partnership for Peace should sign an agreement to this effect. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Meciar, Moravcik on 12 Jan Prague Talks

*LD1301235394 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 13 Jan 94*

["Edited" version of news conference given by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik on 12 January after the Visegrad summit; presented by editors Jarmila Tosecka and Ivo Kunsh; passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[Excerpts] [Kunsh] [passage omitted] I quote the first question. It is said that the Visegrad summit could become an impulse to expand U.S. economic interests in Central Europe. The question is whether Slovakia would not be left on the margin of the economic sphere in the same way it is being left out in some political relations.

[Meciar] "First of all, during the talks, the interest of the United States in direct cooperation was stressed. On the contrary, Mr. Clinton made a statement to the effect that the United States would not exclude us from anything. [passage omitted]

"On the contrary, President Clinton himself is in favor of doing away with barriers in bilateral trade exchange. He favors greater openness of markets and the weakening of the protectionist policy aimed at imports from our country, all of this to make better economic cooperation possible. His statement that the United States will economically support Slovakia is very important for us. It is especially important because many banking circles have been waiting just for this kind of a statement by the President so that some credit lines that are under preparation could open." [passage omitted]

[Tosecka] An editor from the Hungarian section of Slovak Radio was interested in knowing what the content of bilateral talks with the Hungarian partners was,

especially whether there was an agreement on resuming the talks that allegedly were suspended last year.

[Meciar] "We had various talks. Foreign Minister Moravcik will speak about his part and I about mine.

"Prime Minister Boross and I have met. We have discussed both—the issues concerning the Visegrad Four and bilateral relations. We have said that so far the attitudes to controversial issues—that is, ethnic minorities and Gabcikovo—were irrational and damaging to both countries. We agreed that we have to find new points of departure to resolve these issues. We cannot continue harming ourselves by impairing the trustworthiness of each other. We have fully agreed on this.

"As for the concept of future development, the Hungarian Government is affected by the coming May elections. It is very complicated to enter this process through extensive measures now.

"We expressed Slovakia's willingness to conclude the so-called big agreement. We expressed our readiness to hold consultations on all matters of interest. We expressed our readiness to work faster in setting up a customs union. We dealt with the readmission agreement and the related subsequent issues of opening customs checkpoints on the borders. However, we will leave the crucial decisions for the time after elections."

[Moravcik] [passage omitted] "[Foreign] Minister Jeszenszky and I have confirmed our interest in continuing our intensive contacts to clarify some open issues." [passage omitted]

[Kunsh] An Arab journalist was interested in knowing whether there are any obstacles to arms production and arms trade in Slovakia.

[Meciar] "The Slovak arms industry in 1993 produced only 8-9 percent of its 1989 capacity. [passage omitted]

"An analysis that we carried out has shown that our essential shortcoming is that we had lost market since the arms trading and arms-trading institutions did not exist. That is why we have set up a state-owned shareholding company in which several ministries participate. This company will be involved in arms exports and imports.

"The development in Slovakia continued and goes on at present as well. Its quality is relatively high. The systems that have been developed and tested or are undergoing tests meet world parameters. Of course, we will offer them to the market, and the Slovak Army will be equipped with them as well.

"Regions to which this technology will or will not be exported are the subject of a licensing procedure." [passage omitted]

'Aide Memoire' to NATO Summit Addressed

AU1401072594 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 10 Jan 94 pp 1, 3

[TA SR report: "Vitaly Important Decision; NATO—Cornerstone of European Security"]

[Text] Bratislava—Jan Lisuch, state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, on Friday [7 January] presented to representatives of the NATO member countries' and Visegrad Group countries' missions in Bratislava an aide memoire [French term used] on the coming NATO summit. The same text of the aide memoire was presented by Ivan Mjartan, Slovak ambassador in the Czech Republic, to ambassadors of NATO countries residing in Prague.

The text of the aide memoire has concurrently been sent to the Slovak Republic's representative missions in NATO member countries and to NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner. It states:

On the unexplored path of transformation, the countries of Central Europe are facing a number of difficulties and challenges, including the lack of security guarantees. The existing security vacuum and the possible destabilizing impact of negative developments nearby could have a negative influence on democratic structures and the process of economic transformation in this region.

The Slovak Republic, like the other countries of the Visegrad Group, has made the vitally important political decision of seeking integration into the European and transatlantic political, economic, and security structures. The Slovak Republic therefore launched a number of diplomatic activities aimed at demonstrating its desire and readiness to be integrated into NATO without needless delay. NATO, as the cornerstone of the European security architecture, has demonstrated its competence and ability in defending democratic gains.

The Slovak Republic assumes that the coming NATO summit will mean the beginning of a new stage in building a higher form of partnership with the Visegrad Group countries and will enable the expansion of NATO through the admission of these countries of Central Europe. The Slovak Republic expects the alliance to provide a clear and unequivocal reply to the questions of security of our continent, perceived as particularly acute in our region.

The Slovak Republic evaluates highly NATO's Partnership for Peace project, initiated by the U.S. Administration, and is ready to join it and to actively participate in projects and missions within its framework. This project will undoubtedly contribute to a marked intensification of cooperation between the Slovak Republic and NATO and its member countries on political and military issues.

The Slovak Republic would like to express its conviction that the NATO summit of January 1994 will realistically assess the present security situation in the new democracies of the Central European region and that the United States and its allies within the framework of the alliance

will take into consideration the expectations of these countries regarding NATO membership, will not hesitate, and will offer to the countries of the Visegrad Group NATO membership, thereby reinforcing the general stability in this sensitive part of Europe.

In the spirit of the concept of accommodating foreign policy, the Slovak Republic pursues its own national interests—peaceful cooperation based on guaranteed security in its region, freedom of citizens in their democratic state, and economic prosperity.

Foreign Affairs Official on NATO Partnership

LD1301151694 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 13 Jan 94

[Text] Gyorgy Csoti, deputy chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and member of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, held a press briefing this morning. Judit Laszlo reports:

[Laszlo] The Brussels summit and the Partnership for Peace is an important milestone in the process that was proclaimed by the government led by Jozsef Antall in 1990. The point of this was to do away with eastern ties and to approach western integration, Gyorgy Csoti said.

The decision on the Partnership for Peace is important from the point of view of the region's security. The Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee is of a similar opinion. It was this committee that recently invited a Hungarian Foreign Affairs Committee delegation to visit Germany. Returning from there, Gyorgy Csoti said the central and eastern European countries, or rather everybody, even Kazakhstan, has to offer a kind of partnership to the western integration organizations, for example, NATO, which, on the one hand is directed toward membership, and on the other toward cooperation. The latter is all the more important, for it is not possible for everybody to become a NATO member, and not everybody wants to. Gyorgy Csoti here mentioned Russia, which is extended on two continents and is a match for the Western European region.

Csoti also said that German politicians, contrary to rumors, particularly supported the integration endeavors of Hungary and the Visegrad Group countries. Also discussed at the talks in Germany was Hungary soon receiving a status similar to associate membership in the West European Union, Csoti said.

Jeszzenszky on Prague Summit, Visit to Warsaw

WS1401125494 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 14 Jan 94 pp 1, 23

[Interview with Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister Geza Jeszenszky by Grzegorz Lubczyk; place and date not given: "We Can Accept the Arguments of the United States"]

[Text] [Lubczyk] What will Hungarian foreign policy be like after the recent decisions at the NATO summit and the Prague meeting of Visegrad Group leaders and U.S. President Bill Clinton?

[Jeszzenszky] It will not change. We have positively accepted the decisions reached in Brussels and Prague. In the Czech capital, we all agreed that the "Partnership for Peace" plan began to become much more specific. This is not the optimal situation for which Poland and Hungary have strived, however, we are able to accept the U.S. arguments, in line with which both Ukraine and Russia will be incorporated into the process of shaping security and peace in Europe. Now our main task will be

to do as much as possible for the implementation of the "Partnership for Peace" program, and to do this as quickly as possible.

[Lubczyk] Is it already known what will be the order of measures that Hungary is going to take?

[Jeszzenszky] Very soon we will hold important talks. We expect a U.S. military delegation to come to Hungary within two weeks. It is then that we will discuss a strategy for future activities.

[Lubczyk] Mr. Minister, President Clinton left Prague for Kiev and Moscow. Do you not fear any possible U.S.-Ukrainian or U.S.-Russian decisions that might threaten our regional interests? Can we believe the Americans?

[Jeszzenszky] In the 20th century, both our countries were put to so many tests that it is really difficult to have any faith left. However, I believe that in the past the United States and the other NATO states proved that we should change our attitude toward them. The present Western leaders are doing a lot to prevent any doubts concerning the purity of their intentions and declarations.

I think that they treated the Polish and Hungarians warnings very seriously. I cannot even imagine that the United States would sacrifice our countries for their joint interests with Russia or Ukraine. In the past three or four years, we have been making great efforts to make the West realize that we cannot be left aside and that it is also in the interest of the West to incorporate Central Europe into Western structures.

[Lubczyk] Should we still use the expression of the Visegrad Group, after all the controversies among the states of our region leading up to the Prague summit?

[Jeszzenszky] "Visegrad" does not depend exclusively on the words and actions of certain politicians. The Visegrad agreement was the result of the geographical and historical situation. Our countries, being in the same region of Europe, can in fact achieve success together, or they can experience failure together, either in the area of security or economics. Therefore, I am an optimist. I believe that the framework of cooperation that we have had so far will not only be maintained—I believe that it will be extended and strengthened, not for a year or two, but for decades to come. I anticipate a situation similar to the Benelux countries or in Scandinavia to develop. I hope that our nations—I am not referring solely to the Poles and Hungarians—will also achieve the level of fraternity, similar to the Scandinavians, who used to wage wars against each other, whereas today, when we speak about those states, we just naturally list them all together.

[Lubczyk] What is the place of Poland in Hungarian foreign policy?

[Jeszzenszky] I have always been of the opinion that the Polish-Hungarian friendship does not depend on our governments. Of course, tradition still forms the basis of

our relations. However, we are linked not only by similar histories, but also by similar mentalities in both societies. Hungary considers Poland to be one of its most trusted partners, which has been confirmed in many areas of the international activities of both countries.

[Lubczyk] If, as you say, Poland means so much to Hungary, then why is it so that we feel that more could be done in the area of nonpolitical cooperation? Representatives of companies trading with Hungary claim that Poles offer their Hungarian partners better conditions than those offered to Poles by Hungarians. Do you not think that this deadlock in the area of economic cooperation should be broken?

[Jeszenszky] I could not agree with you more. I also think that the degree of economic cooperation, for instance, is not satisfactory. However, we should also bear in mind that nowadays not everything depends on the will of governments. Unfortunately, both our nations have the same weak spot: a degree of snobbishness and excessive admiration of the West. I think that this will change only when economies start to be governed by real markets and market laws. If foreign investors are operating very successfully, both in Poland and Hungary, then it really means something, does it not? I wish our entrepreneurs would draw conclusions from this. I believe that the agreement on free trade will certainly expedite this process.

[Lubczyk] What is the main purpose of your visit to Warsaw?

[Jeszenszky] It is the result of bilateral agreements; however, not only that. As a result of recent events, in short referred to as "Brussels" and "Prague," many issues need to be discussed jointly. Some of the initiatives that were launched during the session of the Central European initiative in Debrecin should be developed as well. The Warsaw talks will definitely not be a waste of time.

Gonczi Views Prague Summit, Regional Cooperation

AU1301190094 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 13 Jan 94 p 2

["F.J.Gy.-K.T."-initialled interview with Hungarian President Arpad Goncz; place and date not given: "Gonczi: The Visegrad Cooperation Cannot Be Buried"]

[Text] [NEPSZABADSAG] Before Prague, and now at Prague too, many people were burying the Visegrad cooperation. From the very beginning, you have been a great supporter of this integration initiative. How do you see all this now as reflected in the current summit?

[Gonczi] I would not say that the Visegrad cooperation was buried in Prague, because this is the regional cooperation of four given countries. In my opinion, this summit gave an impetus to this cooperation; it will probably accelerate it, or at least will increase the desire

for economic cooperation. At the same time, this summit could bring the region's stability closer by the emergence of a negotiating mechanism capable of solving the possible differences of views. Thus, the common work of the four definitely contributes to the stability of the region and plays a balancing role in Central Europe.

[NEPSZABADSAG] However, the Czech leaders openly say that they have something else in mind and, for some time, they have practically refrained from uttering the word Visegrad.

[Gonczi] It makes no difference whatsoever if someone mentions Visegrad or not. The essential thing today is that the forms of cooperation have emerged and, although not a security guarantee, the region received the possibility of a negotiating mechanism that has a balancing power in itself.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Should one fear that rivalry in Central Europe might even accelerate after the acceptance of the Partnership of Peace program?

[Gonczi] Yes, there will obviously be criteria here, and the compatibility of the countries in the region for closer cooperation with NATO will be examined also from a military viewpoint. Given the fact that these conditions have not been formulated at this summit, and they will probably be formulated later, I cannot tell which country will be the first to join. Honestly speaking, I think this is a rather secondary issue, because the stability of the region itself is what matters. I interpret security in a much broader sense than only military security. Naturally, NATO is an extremely important element of European security, but it does not replace an all-European security system. The way I see it, we have now made a step forward in this direction, and a considerable step at that.

[NEPSZABADSAG] President Walesa made a particularly dramatic statement before the meeting. What was your impression about the Polish attitude in Prague?

[Gonczi] My impression is that Lech Walesa came with the most colorful proposals to Prague. Naturally, it was impossible to debate these proposals in detail, but this can obviously be done at a later date.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Does your meeting with Michal Kovac represent any progress in the Hungarian-Slovak relations?

[Gonczi] This was a really important meeting, and it was held in a very good atmosphere. From Michal Kovac's words, I think the most important is that they are trying to solve the issues in harmony with the ideas of the Hungarian minority, and not by excluding this national minority. This was not my first meeting with Mr Kovac; I am absolutely convinced of his good will; he spoke wise and well-thought words. The invitation to come to Budapest continues to be valid, and I hope that this visit will take place soon.

Official Refutes Slovak Ministry Allegations

AU1401105894 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 13 Jan 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Geza Entz, chairman of the Office for Hungarians Living Beyond the Borders, by Jozsef Szabo; place and date not given: "We Are Not Interfering in Slovak Internal Affairs"]

[Text] The Slovak Foreign Ministry accused the Office for Hungarians Living Beyond the Borders of interfering in the internal affairs of Slovakia and of misleadingly explaining the debate of the Bratislava Parliament in December 1993 in its statements connected with the rally held in Revkomarom over the weekend. State Secretary Geza Entz, chairman of the Office for Hungarians Living Beyond the Borders, spoke to NEPSZABADSAG about this new misunderstanding and the controversy over the parliamentary representation of the national minorities living in Hungary.

[Szabo] What did your office misinterpret?

[Entz] Nothing. We informed the diplomats and newsmen on the expected events in connection with the rally in Revkomarom on the basis of the Slovak press reports available to us. One of the articles in question was published by UJ SZO [NEW WORD] in Bratislava, and the Slovaks probably misunderstood this article, although it was an objective one. The Bratislava note does not mention what "misleading" explanation we provided. We are not interfering in internal affairs. We are talking about Soviet-type accusations here. Gromyko used to be a great master of such things, and it seems that the Slovak Foreign Ministry has also become a great master in this.

[Szabo] What is your opinion about the parliamentary decision that made it impossible for the national minorities in Hungary to come up with individual election lists?

[Entz] The government position was the correct one, of course. It is difficult to solve the representation of national minorities in a one-chamber parliament. Their indirect representation can be solved in an extraordinary way by means of a strong positive discrimination. The government proposal wanted this, but the opposition rejected it by bringing up constitutional arguments. It is not true that the ethnic and national minorities in Hungary have no representation. There are several parliamentary deputies who represent the interests of national minorities by following the program of their party.

[Szabo] Is this the acceptable solution?

[Entz] It is not sure at all that this is the way to solve the issue of parliamentary representation for national minorities living in Hungary. In this particular situation, the issue can also be solved properly by means of the ombudsman.

[Szabo] Will the Hungarians living beyond our borders suffer most from this decision?

[Entz] The situation of Hungarians living in the neighboring countries is totally different from the situation of minorities living in Hungary. There is no positive discrimination there, because the Hungarians living in the neighboring countries have political and cultural traditions and they ensured their parliamentary representation with the help of their voters.

The issue of national or ethnic communities living in a quantitative minority is the problem of the country in question. These problems cannot all be solved according to the same pattern. The 20th century proved this. Individual countries must not copy their neighbors.

[Szabo] Do you fear any foreign policy consequences of this decision?

[Entz] The decision will not have serious international consequences. Every member of the international community that does not represent a positive position on settling the national minority issue or displays a withdrawing attitude will make use of this. They are those who "argue" that Hungary has territorial demands. The position of the Hungarian Government played an important role in making sure that the law on national minorities contains the need for modifying the electoral law. This is not an issue closed for good. It should not be interpreted as a factor that hinders the positive settling of the minority issue in this region.

[Szabo] Does it seem that some political circles will try to use this decision against Budapest?

[Entz] This is why we wanted this issue settled in the form of a government proposal. This did not happen, and some circles will make use of this against us. One should not dramatize this fact because, if this decision had not been made, they would find something else.

[Szabo] Do you see any chance of solving the parliamentary representation of national minorities in Hungary in a proper way?

[Entz] I am sure that this issue will be solved properly, because the law on national minorities itself settled this issue from a more essential and thorough viewpoint. The new parliament will certainly return to this issue.

FIDESZ Official on Preparations for Vote

AU1201210494 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 12 Jan 94

[Interview with Janos Ader, deputy executive chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats, by Attila Farkas; place and date not given: "One Should Not Dramatize Viktor Orban's Statement"]

[Text] [Farkas] Preparation for the elections was the major subject at the party conference at Sitke. From this

viewpoint, how do you evaluate the situation of the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ]?

[Ader] The preparation for the election campaign should be evaluated from various viewpoints. One of the essential factors is whether the party has the necessary infrastructure and personnel conditions for a successful campaign. In my opinion, the infrastructure and apparatus development that began in 1992 has now come to its last phase, and this process will be finished by the beginning of the election campaign.

[Farkas] The other important factor is obviously the selection of candidates. To what extent is this work ready?

[Ader] There are two branches of political preparations, and in one of them, namely in nominating candidates, the preparation is slowly coming to an end. We will hold a national committee meeting on the first weekend of February, when we will approve the list of candidates running in individual districts and the territorial lists, and the meeting will also decide on the national list. In addition, it is also important to formulate the political program and the messages to the voters. Actually, we are talking here about the expansion of the program elements adopted at the FIDESZ congress in Debrecen, and formulating this program in a language understandable for broader strata of voters.

[Farkas] Regarding the nomination of candidates, to what extent did the events that took place since the meeting in November affect this activity?

[Ader] Fortunately, these events did not affect the nomination of candidates at all; I do not know of any candidate who withdrew from representing the FIDESZ at the elections because of those events.

[Farkas] However, this process must have probably caused problems politically....

[Ader] No party, including the FIDESZ, benefits from personnel conflicts emerging on the eve of elections. Naturally, this did us no good either, but I think the FIDESZ has already overcome this period. The relevant debates in the FIDESZ ended in November 1993, and now everyone is focusing on a successful campaign.

[Farkas] The fact that the FIDESZ deputies in Gyongyos left the party at the end of last week seems to slightly contradict this....

[Ader] This is a fact, but I would not attribute particular importance to this, because Gabor Fodor originates from Gyongyos and the group of people there were connected to him. I am sure that Gyongyos remains an isolated event, and I would be surprised to see similar events in other areas.

[Farkas] Did the possible future coalition ideas affect the nomination of candidates?

[Ader] This was not a factor in selecting candidates; the decisive principle is to seek persons who are trained in a certain professional area, are known and appreciated by the locals, and accept the political values and goals of the FIDESZ.

However, a possible coalition formation did not emerge at all because there are a lot of uncertainty factors here....

[Farkas] Did Viktor Orban's recent statement and its various interpretation cause any disturbance in the preparation for the elections?

[Ader] This did not affect the preparations for the elections. Besides, I find the coalition speculations rather useless and a waste of time, even if I know that this becomes a national pastime with the approach of the elections. We must accept the fact that the future coalition will be determined by the election results and the previous programs and political orientations. Consequently, it is possible that a political constellation emerges, which no one expects. In this respect, our previous position continues to be valid, namely that the FIDESZ is ready to cooperate with every party that accepts the basic political values and the rules of democracy. The compatibility of various party programs will basically affect cooperation after the elections. We do not have any reason to change our current position.

[Farkas] Is Viktor Orban's temporary silence connected with the aforementioned statement? Are there any consequences of this statement in the FIDESZ?

[Ader] I do not think that the aforementioned statement should be dramatized, and it is also useless to add any political combinations.

Olechowski, Pawlak, Walesa Discuss Prague Talks

WS1401113994 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
14 Jan 94 pp 1, 23

[Article by Stanislaw Grzymiski: "Olechowski and Pawlak Back From Prague; We Can Count on Help"—last paragraph attributed to P.K.]

[Text] "Poland is now more secure and closer to NATO," said Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski at a press conference on Thursday [13 January] after having returned from Prague.

Commenting on the talks of the Visegrad Group leaders, the chief Polish diplomat based his view on the evolution that has occurred in the concept of the "Partnership for Peace" since it was first put forward by Bill Clinton.

Minister Olechowski believes that the U.S. "Partnership for Peace" initiative was enriched by the declaration that NATO will remain open to the states of Central Europe.

These states were assured that they can count on NATO's help in crises and that their security is closely related to the security of NATO. "Partnership for Peace" will also incorporate Ukraine and Russia into the international security system.

Minister Olechowski claims that "Partnership for Peace" will enhance Poland's defense capabilities. The proposed program of military cooperation with NATO will lead to "interoperationalness" of the armies of NATO and of the states of Central Europe. In line with this program, Poland will have access to NATO technology and information, as well as to Western early-warning systems. Poland will also have the right to hold consultations with the 16 member states of NATO if its sovereignty is jeopardized, and the possibility of establishing joint units with them.

While commenting on the talks in Prague, Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak said that, aside from the "Partnership for Peace," which offers Poland "political prospects and prospects of security," we also need a "partnership for development." He stressed that "economic stability is one of the most important security factors."

Prime Minister Pawlak stated that the leaders of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia agreed on the need to extend the political platform of the Visegrad Group to the economic platform and to establish a formula of "G-4," similar to "G-7," the seven richest countries in the world. The Visegrad Group states will jointly resolve regional problems, intensify their economic cooperation, and create the appropriate infrastructure. It is expected that, in April of this year, the liberalization of trade within the framework of the Central European Free Trade Zone will be accelerated.

Asked whether the meeting of the presidents of the United States and the Visegrad Group states was a

success, President Lech Walesa stressed upon his return from Prague that new concepts are being created that are headed in the right direction; however, the important thing is the rate of the transformations: "I take advantage of any good moment; there are also other strategists, who walk the assigned path step by step," said the president, emphasizing the role of the mass media, especially in the West, in explaining Poland's stand on this issue.

NATO Summit 'School of Realistic Thinking'

AU1401120094 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish
14 Jan 94 p 1

[Untitled Stanislaw Cwik commentary from the "Hundred Words" series]

[Text] The Prague summit has turned out to be a proper school of realistic thinking for the new Polish Government. We failed to achieve success there. We were firmly shown where our place lies and what we can expect from our contacts with the powers. And the most we can expect is sympathy. Strategic decisions about the demarcation of influence are going to be made without our direct participation. That is how things used to be, and that is how they remain.

This initial cold shower will be useful for the Pawlak government. It will enable the government to dispense with the "messianic" delusions of previous governments and might even help it establish a realistic program of cooperation with the West for the next four years, a program based on the strength of our exports and on military economic diplomacy, and capable of defending our industry and our commercial rights. Such a program has been called for by the coalition.

Prime Minister Pawlak seems to understand this. Instead of being seized with a fit of despair about the Prague summit and shedding tears over the flimsy condition of the Visegrad Group, he is seeking new paths of cooperation. On the other hand, President Walesa clearly cannot come to terms with reality and is not hiding his profound disappointment with the West. But let us hope he recovers quickly and draws practical conclusions from this successive harsh lesson.

Hungarian Foreign Minister Arrives for Talks

LD1401092194 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0845 GMT
14 Jan 94

[Text] Warsaw, 14 Jan—Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky arrived in Warsaw on Friday morning. During his one-day visit to Poland, the Hungarian diplomat will meet President Lech Walesa, Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak, and the deputy Sejm and Senate speakers. He will also hold private talks with Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski. The Hungarian delegation, led by Jeszenszky, will conduct talks in the Polish Foreign Ministry. Bilateral relations will be discussed

with special emphasis on the lack of progress in economic and trade cooperation.

Received by Walesa

LD1401114994 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1030 GMT
14 Jan 94

[Text] Warsaw, 14 Jan—On Friday morning, President Lech Walesa received Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky, who is on an official visit to Poland.

Welcoming the guest, the president said that it is important for Poland and Hungary to speak up on issues that are important for Europe because "others can do something for us and without us [as received]."

In Walesa's opinion, both countries should maintain working contacts "in the context" of the situation in Europe, "which determines our security and prosperity." Walesa said that the Partnership for Peace proposal can be a considerable partnership if "we decide about its shape ourselves." He added that the gifts are nice but do not always "suit our appetite."

Minister Jeszenszky stated that decisions made in Brussels and Prague "would not have been as significant without the work of Poland and the Polish president." He added that it is important to keep U.S. and West European politicians to their word and ensure that they fulfill their promises. "We have reasons to hope, but we also have reasons to be concerned," Jeszenszky said.

Possible Advisers to Prime Minister Profiled

WS1001193094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
7 Jan 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Eza Czackowska and Renata Wrobel: "Who Will Advise the Prime Minister?"]

[Text] Currently, two teams of advisers for the prime minister are being formed. The first team, a component of the Cabinet, will consist of permanent advisers who will advise the prime minister on ways of better organizing the work of state departments. The second team, the task of which is to draw conclusions and develop proposals for resolving various issues, will include experts representing different segments of society. The second team is headed by Franciszek Mlecze, under secretary of state at the Office of the Council of Ministers. In addition, the prime minister can seek advice from the Chief Executive Committee of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]. Concurrently, the prime minister is considering the issue of creating a council for public-economic issues within the Council of Ministers. Those who are responsible for the creation of these advising bodies are not revealing the names of the advisers to be, claiming that it is too early to disclose their identities.

Unofficial sources say that Bogdan Lukasiewicz, Henryk Sobierajski, and Slawomir Wozniak could be named as advisers to the prime minister.

Bogdan Lukasiewicz

In the past, he was one of Pawlak's closest advisers. He is "loved" more by the PSL leadership than by ordinary party members. "He is used to settling things in high places," says one PSL member. Lukasiewicz (born in 1950) owns a big farm and is joint owner of a transport company cooperating with the Wansa company that attempted to import 220,000 sheep from the Caucasus. Minister of Agriculture Andrzej Smietanko made assurances that this deal was cut short. Until late December 1993, Bogdan Lukasiewicz, along with the People's Economic Association, held a controlling interest in the Glospress company, which publishes the Lodz newspaper GLOS PORANNY. Beginning this January, the majority of shares of the indebted newspaper are being bought by the Galtex company, Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, and the PSL.

Beginning in 1973, Bogdan Lukasiewicz was a United Peasant Party [ZSL] member. Under the previous ZSL leadership, he performed the functions of the Chief Executive Committee treasurer. Currently, despite Pawlak's support, new Chief Council members have not elected him to the Chief Executive Committee. Mr. Lukasiewicz was a deputy in the 10th and the First Sejm; he ran for the Sejm in the last elections but lost in his Lodz electoral district—he was number 53 on the all-country electoral list and could not become a government member. During "Pawlak's 33 days," he participated in negotiations on the coalition and was one of the candidates for deputy prime minister for economic issues; during the last period of the formation of Pawlak's Cabinet, Mr. Lukasiewicz headed the group of PSL experts involved in talks. He helped Pawlak write his inaugural speech to the Sejm. Before the PSL won in the elections, he told ZYCIE WARSZAWY: "The PSL and the Democratic Left Alliance have enough members who have gone through a deputy political school and can become members of the Office of the Council of Ministers. With us, this institution would have worked perfectly. Our people would not be strangers there." Currently, he is a member of the PSL Chief Executive Council and controls primary peasant organizations.

Henryk Sobierajski

He is responsible for contacts with the mass media. He is a well-known citizen of Lodz, a grandson of Hubala and son of Krystyna Sobierajska, who worked for the newspaper Lodz GLOS ROBOTNIZY (currently, GLOS PORANNY) all her life.

Henryk Sobierajski graduated from the Academy of Physical Culture, wrote for GLOS PORANNY and DZIENNIK LODZKI, and later (until June 1993) ran the company that edited GLOS PORANNY. He is not a party member. However, people think that he sympathizes with the PSL and is friendly with Bogdan Lukasiewicz. He has never run in elections.

The Office That Plans Government Activities

Under Hanna Suchocka, this office was headed by Tadeusz Syryjczyk and was an advisory body. All of its members except Slawomir Wozniak have been dismissed. Currently, Mr. Wozniak may become one of Pawlak's advisers.

Slawomir Wozniak

He graduated from the Higher School of Engineering in Radom and earned his doctoral degree in economics at the Academy of Political Sciences. Mr. Wozniak worked at the "Lucznik" factory and, in the late 1980's, was assistant to State Council Deputy Chairman Tadeusz Witold Mlynczak (president of the Democratic Party).

Franciszek Mleczeko

He was born in 1931. His current duty is to organize the second team of advisers. He is a professor of social sciences dealing with social issues of village life, agriculture, and culture. He studied in Warsaw, Moscow, and Paris. Since 1968, he has lectured at Warsaw Agricultural Academy, Warsaw University, the Academy of Social Sciences within the Central Committee, and the High School of Social Sciences. He was a member of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] until it ceased to exist. Currently, he is not a party member. In the opinion of PSL members, he is still a PZPR supporter. He began to attend PSL meetings on Grzybowska street (PZPR headquarters) as early as at the beginning of the 1970's; he used to write for the quarterly WIES WSPOLCZESNA. From 1974 to 1978, he was deputy director of the Institute of Culture at the Ministry of Culture and Art and shared an office with Michal Strak.

Professor Franciszek Mleczeko says that Prime Minister Pawlak charged him with the first task before the 1991 elections. He analyzed the situation in the Polish political scene and the PSL's chances of winning the elections. During the last elections, he was proposed as a possible PSL candidate, but he rejected the suggestion, claiming that he did not want to engage in politics. Mr. Mleczeko states that he is looking for people who are not connected with any parties.

Wladyslaw Szymanski

He is an exception. He is a member of a group of advisers, both in the Office of the Council of Ministers and the PSL Chief Executive Committee. Professor of Economics Wladyslaw Szymanski is respected in PSL circles. He was born in 1941. He is an author of the PSL economic program. He is lecturing at the Main School of Commerce and heads the Analysis of Markets and Competitiveness Committee. Mr. Szymanski has been connected with the people's movement since 1960: First, he participated in the Rural Youth Union; in 1963, he joined the ZSL; in 1977-80, he was adviser to Roman Malinowski; in 1980, he became a member of the ZSL Chief Executive Committee; and in 1985-89, he was a member of the State Council and a deputy in the Ninth

Sejm. Like all of the other advisers, he cooperated with WIES WSPOLCZESNA (1974-77). PSL circles respect him for efficient economic analysis (some deputies say that his predictions are too "catastrophic"). However, some of his prognoses have never been realized. He is said to be modest and not a "career man." When Pawlak's government was being created, Mr. Szymanski's name was proposed for a ministerial post among the others. However, he rejected all of the proposals. He did not run for the Sejm, either. Some well-informed circles state that, after his work in the State Council, he began to hate social activities.

Jan Bisztyga and Other Advisers

Deputy prime ministers are organizing their own groups of advisers (Secretary of State Andrzej Zor is responsible for this work in Mark Borowski's office; in Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz's office, this is being done by Under Secretary of State Grzegorz Rydlewski; in Aleksandr Luczak's office by Under Secretary of State Stanislaw Dobrzanski). Some ministers have also started creating their own groups of advisers. The nomination of Jan Bisztyga to the post of adviser for Michal Strak, chairman of the Office of Council of Ministers, was the most controversial over the past few weeks. Mr. Bisztyga was the last spokesman for the mass media within the PZPR Central Committee. He performed his duties from the spring of 1989 until the last day of the PZPR's existence. Being a PZPR spokesman, he first met with journalists in mid-April 1989. He wished to implement a "new information policy" of the PZPR, describing it as "opening doors to primary PZPR committees." Before the elections were held, he organized forums with journalists entitled "Only for Those Who Think" and reassured that main candidates of the government-coalition faction have victory "in their pockets." After the elections were held, he was the first to state in the PZPR Central Committee: "We have lost. We should give back power." In 1972-74, Mr. Bisztyga performed the functions of under secretary of state in the Foreign Ministry and was Polish ambassador to Greece and Great Britain. Officials of the Office of the Council of Ministers state that he will use his experience in his new post and aid Mr. Strak on international issues.

Solidarity Plans Demonstration Over Budget Bill

WS1301101494 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
13 Jan 94 p 2

[Article by Piotr Adamowicz: "Changes Needed in the Budget"]

[Text] The authorities of "Solidarity" ["S"] have requested the government to make changes in the budget bill. They believe that the projected price increases will result in higher inflation and higher maintenance costs, as well as lower real incomes of employees. On 9 February, they will stage an all-national demonstration in Warsaw.

According to the National Committee [KK], the increases in the prices of energy and other goods of the so-called basic consumer basket scheduled for this year will bring about an increase in maintenance costs and a drop in employees' real incomes. Another factor that will limit these incomes will be higher tax rates. "S" fears that the policy of the present government will make it impossible to carry out the fundamental provision of the "Pact on Enterprise," which pertains to an increase in real wages in the production sphere in a situation of a projected increase in the GDP. "I always knew that the present governing group does not meet our political expectations; the budget bill proved that it does not meet our social expectations, either," stated "S" Chairman Marian Krzaklewski.

Most of the KK members support the idea of organizing protests. The differences were only over the timing and the form of the protests. The proposal to stage an all-national demonstration in Warsaw was backed, as one KK member put it, on such a scale as to "make all of the windowpanes in the Office of the Council of Ministers fall out." More than a dozen persons wanted to organize strikes; a few discussed the possibility of a general strike. According to observers, the union is not prepared for a major strike action. The appeals for strikes should be looked upon as a kind of stick. "S" authorities hope that the major price increases projected in the budget law will cause an increase in social impatience and spontaneous protests. Then the union will be able to try to organize a more serious strike action.

The unionists were very surprised that the government would like to obtain credit from the World Bank for the Mass Privatization Program and for the National Investment Funds. "The bill on the privatization of state-run enterprises no longer has the provisions in line with which all citizens are able to purchase the shares of privatized companies, in a situation of the insufficiency of domestic capital and savings. Thus, finally, there will be no chance of including the citizens in the processes of privatization," stated KK Presidium member Jerzy Ostroch.

"S" has invited experts of the extraparlimentary center-right groupings to take part in the work of the team that is supposed to draft a constitution bill. The invitations will be extended by Chairman Krzaklewski. The team for the new constitution will set up a Senate Club of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union "S."

According to the KK, the refusal to admit the states to NATO affronts the aspirations of societies that for half a year strove to regain their identity.

Daily Speculates on Future of SLD, Cabinet

WS1301144594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
13 Jan 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Eliza Olczyk and Marcin Dominik Zdort:
"Will the SLD Split and How?"]

[Text] *After two months of Waldemar Pawlak Cabinet's term, after the draft budget has been presented and the parliament has worked intensively, one can try to assess the direction in which the present Cabinet's actions are heading. Will this be a government that will manage to stop the run of misfortunes by surviving the parliament's entire term of office for the first time since 1989, or will it end up like the previous governments? Deputy Prime Minister Marek Borowski has been saying that changes will be introduced to the extent possible. Will these changes be sufficient?*

Apart from an unshaken belief in the current Cabinet's success expressed by Zbigniew Siemiatkowski of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], other politicians have been having many fears, and these fears are not always accompanied by the malicious hope that the current coalition may be just another example of failure.

Winners' Optimism

Zbigniew Siemiatkowski thinks that the coalition is heading in the right direction: "One can have doubts about whether the rate at which we are going is appropriate, or about whether everything contained in the SLD election program was implemented. In that regard, everyone, of course, has a right to his own opinion," he says. "We regard the 19 September elections as entering into a contract with society for four years. In the contract, there are some priority goals, and there are also some less important ones that will be implemented at a later stage. The year 1994 is a time of fundamental reorganization of the process of managing the state and also of macroeconomic processes aimed at eliminating the biggest irregularities in the economic policy. We are aware that society, while agreeing to the direction of the transformations, spoke against the social policy implemented thus far. We will try to coordinate the two processes, but it is not possible to do that within a few months. But some mechanisms were included even in the current budget draft, which will bring improvement for households as quickly as in two to three years."

According to Siemiatkowski, the main danger facing the current Cabinet comes from the impatience of those who expect quick successes, whereas the Cabinet's main chance is that it is in the comfortable position of being able to plan its policy. The previous cabinets did not have that comfort.

"The failure of our Cabinet and of our ideas would be a failure of the entire system," Siemiatkowski says. "The failure of the reforms carried through by the left-wing government would not automatically mean that society will put its faith in someone else from the left wing."

"The Union of Labor [UP] is further removed from the governing coalition today than at any time in the past," says UP leader Ryszard Bugaj. "Those who have a dominating position in the coalition—I do not think the entire coalition speaks with one voice—seem to have a preference for a strategy of adaptation that will leave the

country's powerful centers intact." The moods and aspirations of big social groups play a minor role from the standpoint of that strategy. According to Bugaj, an attempt at a radical shift in the economic policy would be massively opposed by the press (that is, mostly the liberal press) and by the president, even if big social groups expected the policy to be implemented. Under the circumstances, the coalition's leadership decided in favor of trying to gain the support of small but strong pressure groups. Such a policy is dangerous because it can lead to a conviction in society that no matter how one votes on election day, the result is always the same, and big frustrations always result from such convictions. Part of the SLD is clearly heading toward a liberalization of the economy. Influential SLD activists think that the party will manage to achieve what the Democratic Union [UD] failed to achieve along with the liberals because the SLD has the left-wing label. That is not very likely to happen.

"Some of my colleagues have been watching that with satisfaction, thinking that UP will remain as the only credible political party that does not change its views," Bugaj says. "The trouble is that, during the next elections (it is not a certain thing at all that they must take place in four years because they might as well happen sooner), many people will decide that mistakes and failures are to be attributed to the so-called left wing, and we are included in that label."

"A Moment of Truth Will Come Soon"

...prophesies Bugaj. "A major danger to the coalition's coherency will come from radical social problems. They do exist even now anyway, but they will not be a danger to the coalition until they are articulated and transformed into specific action. That is because then the All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement [OPZZ], which is very dependent on social moods, will have its room for maneuvering radically curtailed."

According to Janusz Piechocinski of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], the next presidential elections are a prospect for the governing coalition (unless there is social unrest). With the current configuration of forces in parliament determined by the voters, presidential rules are the only alternative left at the coalition's disposal. So the coalition's stability is a guarantee for maintaining the parliamentary-Cabinet rules. The political calendar is advantageous to the governing coalition. We have both self-governmental and presidential elections coming up. Both Lech Walesa and Aleksander Kwasniewski have already begun their presidential campaigns. So the coalition has a very good chance of surviving till the time of the presidential election. But the coalition's weakest spot is in the individual parties that make it up. The government does not have to be afraid of losing 30 or 50 votes in the parliament because the margin of safety it enjoys is substantial. So the party leaders' biggest problems will concern what happens inside their individual parties. Aleksander Kwasniewski wants to change his electorate by courting those who up to now were UD voters, and by

showing that the SLD is a modern type of party that cares about the country's stability. On the other hand, if Kwasniewski loses the votes of those who up to now were his electorate, he may lose the presidential election. That contradiction has been manifesting itself more and more though because Kwasniewski publicly admits to being a social-liberal, and that is primarily because he does not like poverty. But he has not yet decided to make such bold statements within the party itself, and this is the way it is going to be for a long time.

Besides, there are different trends within the SLD, and different aspirations as well. According to Piechocinski, coming into alliance with the Polish Socialist Party was a big mistake because it strengthened the extreme left-wing and orthodox wing within the SLD. The OPZZ is another problem because its leaders have big political ambitions, and, apart from that, an internal fight among various leaders is going on within it. Kwasniewski may face enormous problems with coming to grips with this phenomenon. In addition, the situation is being complicated by the position taken by UP, which remonstrates with the electorate upon...

The SLD Having Betrayed Left-Wing Ideals

That causes a certain gap because the SLD's rank and file, who have been watching this, are asking themselves the question: "Apart from Kwasniewski's personal satisfaction, what is the use of a victory at all?" That may lead the SLD to transform itself into a federation of clubs that will not vote the same way in the Sejm.

The Polish Peasant Party [PSL] also faces a difficult situation because there have occurred big differentiations in the countryside, and there have emerged many groups there whose interests are completely different. It is impossible to satisfy all of them. That is how the big debate in the PSL concerning its program came about: What kind of a party is the PSL supposed to be, and what are its ideas concerning the state? If the PSL decides to meet the demands of all of its electorate groups on an immediate basis, that could create serious problems for the governing coalition. But the biggest danger comes from the possible lack of economic achievements.

"Unless there are such achievements, the current political elite will be thrown out with a bang because the voters will push them aside for their inefficiency," Piechocinski says.

Krzysztof Krol of the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN] predicts that a Belweder-peasant government will be formed in a few months. "The most likely scenario for the current governing coalition to split up is for a...

Conflict Between the SLD and the President

...to occur during the presidential election campaigns of Lech Walesa and Aleksander Kwasniewski," says Krol, who, under this scenario, also predicts the dismissal of the "postcommunist ministers" from the government,

who had been recommended by the SLD. According to the KPN leader, the SLD will then be in the opposition, and we could see early elections. The current governing coalition could also be divided through evolutions of both parties, which today are bound by power and a similar past. "The PSL wants to become a centrist and a traditional kind of party, whereas the SLD wants to be social-democratic in order to replace UD," Krol says.

But Zbigniew Janas of UD thinks that the fate of the current coalition depends on what happens to the SLD itself: "There is an enormous external [as published] differentiation within the SLD, which is similar to the one present in the Citizens Parliamentary Club [OKP] after the elections of June 1989. It would be a worthwhile effort to examine the course of events leading up to the OKP's disintegration. Most probably a split within the SLD will take place at the same rate. For the moment, there is still the euphoria in the aftermath of the elections and the satisfaction after having taken over power, but disputes will begin when the government encounters its first problems," Janas says. According to the Sejm deputy for UD, internal opposition will increase its strength also within the PSL, which may pose a danger for the entire coalition. This is even more so because there will not be as much money devoted to agriculture as some would like to see. Janas thinks it would be a miracle if the coalition supporting Pawlak's Cabinet survived until the end of the four-year term.

SdRP's Kwasniewski on Decentralization Policy

PM1301120794 Wroclaw GAZETA ROBOTNICZA in Polish 4 Jan 94 p 5

[Interview with Aleksander Kwasniewski, leader of Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, by PAP correspondent Marzanna Doering; place and date not given]

[Text] [Doering] Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] is at present undergoing an astonishing metamorphosis. After a time of discreet silence on the subject of the feud between the government and local self-government structures, in mid-December it suddenly issued a statement of its position on that subject, a statement in which words like "decentralization," "self-government," and "citizens' society" literally abound.

[Kwasniewski] We have never, in fact, kept silent on the subject, and there is nothing paradoxical in the position adopted by the SdRP Supreme Council. Because a large number of misunderstandings have arisen around the questions of self-government and the administration reform, it was necessary to define our position clearly. After a debate on the subject, the Supreme Council adopted an official position that is now binding for us. In all of our dealings in parliament, as well as in internal government negotiations, we will defend the decentralization of power, the modeling of a citizens' society, the consolidation of self-government structures, and the expansion of the range of competence of these structures. These principles also apply to other self-government

structures, such as self-government bodies in educational establishments, economic self-management bodies, and trade unions. Our interest in decentralization is not an expediency strategy. We believe that decentralization makes sense from the viewpoint of the new state structure and the new decisionmaking system.

[Doering] All of this sounds very fine. By voicing such views in the six months separating us from the planned local self-government elections, you can easily gain the reputation of a keen self-management advocate. At the same time, the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] has come to be seen as against local self-government structures—in a situation where the coalition is supposed to make joint decisions.

[Kwasniewski] On what grounds do you base your claim?

[Doering] I base it on the silence maintained by the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] on the freeze imposed on the self-government pilot program, the suspension of the transfer of schools to parish authorities' management, and the collapse of the finances act, which entailed the preservation of the income-tax distribution system that is highly disadvantageous to active parishes and the absence of the compensation payments scheme for VAT [value-added-tax] induced losses. Should I go on with the list? All these decisions were made by the government and by parliament.

[Kwasniewski] The majority of these cases involved either unfortunate timing or other disadvantageous coincidence. If the government had not been appointed in October but rather, two or three months earlier, maybe we could have avoided a greater number of these setbacks. As it was, however, the government was destined to carry out its work on the budget in great haste. This was compounded by the need to attend to local self-government draft acts—for example, the finance act—which were not even prepared by the present government. Perhaps we should have shown more confidence in the work of our predecessors, but you cannot really deny the new government the right to make its own decisions in such important matters. If the previous cabinet had prepared a draft constitution, surely you would not insist that the new government should pass it on to parliament right away during its first session?

[Doering] I am not sure.... If it was a good enough project, I would probably not worry too much that it was not of my own making. But let us return to our main question: When can we expect the SdRP declarations of support for local self-government structures to be shored up by more tangible actions?

[Kwasniewski] We are all facing a forthcoming test—the local self-government elections scheduled for the end of May and the beginning of June. Then, all our proposals and decisions will be verified by the voters themselves. It is not as if we could get away with talking nonsense about the self-government system, or with doing nothing about it except making well-meaning noises. Self-government structures are at present controlled by the Democratic

Union and other groups of similar political orientation. If it were to become apparent that the present coalition has not only failed to do anything tangible to further the cause of self-government but even halted the progress of certain self-government processes, I have not the slightest doubt that today's opposition would win the elections. On the other hand, if the coalition demonstrates successfully its honorable intentions concerning the self-government system, it will stand a good chance of succeeding.

[Doering] You speak as if the coalition were unanimous on the question of a reform of the system.

[Kwasniewski] I will not deny that from the very beginning there have been differences between us. The PSL is more cautious, and we in turn have no reason to question their knowledge of the functioning of self-government structures at the parish level. It is, after all, their own ground. The PSL has never questioned the need to decentralize power and to reinforce self-government structures, but it adopts a different viewpoint: We should put things in order first and reform them later. In my opinion, in certain areas this position is quite sensible, but in others it could possibly prove slightly too conservative. We have always believed that we should make decisions in favor of changes. We have expressed our political will and we will try to put it into practice. By mid-January, we will have held our first round of talks with the PSL. I hope that we will be able to decide whose position should prevail before the end of January. We need to make sure that a range of fundamental questions is sorted out first—first, the principles of financing the parishes; then, extension of their range of competence; finally, the issue of whether we should create a new system of districts.

[Doering] What if you come up against a brick wall in your talks with the PSL?

[Kwasniewski] We will then continue to discuss the same things in parliament. We are not alone there.

[Doering] What decisions should you be making in the question of the package of parliamentary bills prepared by Hanna Suchocka's government—that is, the district and voivodship reform, the central authorities reform, the reform of the civil service sector, the government order system, and the reorganization of the Council of Ministers Office [URM]?

[Kwasniewski] In all of these areas, changes are urgently necessary: There is no doubt whatsoever about that. The difficulties could begin as soon as we come to argue over the details—and the details fall within the brief of the working group for the public administration reform, appointed in mid-December by the SdRP Supreme Council. The civil service is a most important stabilizing element in the state administration system, and the sooner it is introduced, the better. We must find ways to minimize corruption, and that goal is best served by a system of government orders. I would exercise the greatest caution toward the URM reorganization project.

I always suspect that all reorganization is the result of the need for a radical review of the personal appointments in the given system. Regardless of whether the URM is given a new name and whether it is left as one bloc or divided into three general directorates, it will always be with us because it has three important functions to fulfill: provision of services to the government and the prime minister; legislation and contacts with parliament; and coordination of the operations of local government administration.

[Doering] In the latest campaign, the SLD made a firm pledge of support for the district reform. What districts and when? Minister Strak says: Let us first put the local state administration in individual regions in order, and then we can decide whether we should organize self-government elections there.

[Kwasniewski] In my opinion, once you have started something, it is advisable to see it through. Stopping a new development as soon as you started seems to me too defensive a strategy. There is no sense in maintaining the regional system today: The regions are, as it were, semidistrict creations, and as such they remain strictly artificial. We must make it quite clear that we intend to finish what we started. The district reform will mean that the number of voivodships will be reduced to about 15-20. This will inevitably cause heated arguments and conflicts because the parliament that approved that formula for the reform was chosen to represent the present configuration of 49 voivodships. We can expect that all conceivable sorts of lobbies will be set up and activated in defense of the status quo. If, say, we return to the original blueprint of 17 voivodships, what do you expect will be the reaction of the deputies from the 32 voivodships that would then cease to exist? They would have to go back to their earlier milieus and local configurations—but many present voivodship centers have already become accustomed to wielding their local power.

[Doering] The PSL wants voivodships to function in the self-government system.

[Kwasniewski] I do not see justification for the correctness of this concept in our circumstances because Poland functions as a unitary system. If a state is not organized as a federal or individual *laender* system, voivodships should be linked to the central authorities, and voivodas should represent the central government.

[Doering] Because we have come to the subject of voivodas, let me cite your own words spoken before 19 September: "We will not check individuals' party membership cards to assert from which political affiliations people come to us. If they have satisfactory qualifications, they should be placed in those posts where their abilities will be put to the best use."

[Kwasniewski] I still subscribe to that opinion.

[Doering] How does it square with the announcement that you will replace existing voivodas by people from the victorious coalition?

[Kwasniewski] Anyone who charges me with calling for purges will be at serious odds with the truth. I said that a new political situation arose as a result of the election. I may even apologize that the old government lost the election, but that is what happened. Today there are people who say: "We are not interested in politics, but we are at your disposal." If they are competent administrators, they will retain their posts. And there are also others who say: "We do not see a place for us here anymore; our mission is over." That was precisely what took place in Pila, Zielona Gora, and Wloclawek. There are now vacancies there. How do you imagine we should go about finding new candidates to these posts? Pick them off the street? Or from the opposition's ranks? We have adopted the principle that the group that won the election in a given voivodship can assume initiative in this matter. Because that means that that group has at its disposal the most numerous personnel reserves to be recruited from among its broad base of supporters. However, candidates must still obtain approval from the voivodship's self-government assembly. And the candidates from Pila, Zielona Gora, and Olsztyn did obtain such approval. These people are by no means party apparatchiks: They are all competent experts.

[Doering] The SdRP December statement contained a mention of a proposed change in the election law, designed to improve representation at parish level. Does this suggest that you agree with Minister Strak when he claims that councils are not representative?

[Kwasniewski] The May 1990 elections were won by citizens' committees. But where are citizens' committees today? We have also introduced candidates from a variety of electoral lists into the councils.

[Doering] That problem could be resolved in the elections themselves rather than through changes in the electoral law.

[Kwasniewski] We are considering a proposal to choose parish elders and town and city mayors in universal suffrage, although opinions on that solution are rather divided.

[Doering] What would be the SdRP's interest in such a move?

[Kwasniewski] Precisely. I am not altogether sure whether it would be in our interest. That is why we are still hesitating. Local self-government elections do not attract much popular attention, so it could be that such direct choice would enhance their attractiveness and increase the chance of stimulating local communities to greater activity.

[Doering] In other words, it would pull those who are as yet undecided toward you?

[Kwasniewski] I do not see it in terms of political interest. Let me risk a prediction: The approaching elections will end in a big compromise, and no one will be able to say that they have won an unqualified victory in it.

Transformations Minister on Privatization

WS1301125994 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 13 Jan 94 p 5

[Article by Ada Kostrz-Kostecka: "How Many Changes, How Much Continuation?"]

[Text] Did the fact that a coalition government was formed cause any changes in the privatization program? Or is it really a continuation of the methods employed so far?

This is the diagnosis that the participants of a seminar organized by the Economic Sciences Institute of the Polish Academy of Sciences tried to make.

According to Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek, who participated in the seminar, the weakness of the ownership transformation processes carried out so far has been the lack of a privatization strategy, linking it to the economic policy, lack of the criteria for the evaluation of the transformations, and analyses of their effects. The founders' supervision over the partnerships was insufficient; however, these shortcomings are not being eliminated. There are still difficulties in communicating with trade unions. Privatization with the participation of private individuals acting as strategic investors was also not always successful. Motivation for privatization is still only passive (the desire to escape dividends and the popiwek—tax on excessive wage increases—or the managers' desire to maintain a "row of souls" in the enterprise). The characteristic feature of Polish ownership transformations is also the modest participation of capital privatization; employee's privatization is dominating, which large enterprises advised against. In the past, the ownership laws were not set in order; it concerns reprivatization and cooperative property.

Minister Kaczmarek wants to continue employing the privatization techniques that have been used so far; however, at the same time, along with other ministries, he intends to draw up a "privatization map." The map will show strategic areas, in which the Treasury will maintain most of the shares, and the other areas, which will not be limited in ownership transformations. Privatization procedures will be set in order. It is also planned that a dormant path of privatization—that is, auctions—will be established. The minister believes that most of the property that could be sold at once was actually sold; the rest of the enterprises need restructuring before this could be done. This is supposed to be achieved through the program of National Investment Funds, EFSAL [expansion unknown] and the SRP [expansion unknown], financed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the European Community.

The scientists participating in the seminar focused first on remarks concerning the transformations that have been made so far, as well as on conclusions concerning the future. According to Barbara Blaszczyk, in the "Directions of Privatization" for 1994, too many priorities were adopted; therefore, it will be difficult to implement all of them. So far, the employees' privatization, powered by the initiative "from below," has been the quickest; therefore, the "Pact on State Enterprise" unnecessarily imposes on enterprises a six-month period for selecting a privatization path. The employees of large and good enterprises—for example, those that are sent to the Stock Exchange—gain too much in privatization. In comparison with other countries, the overall balance sheet of privatization looks good; it is just a pity that some partnerships have become stuck in the intermediate stage.

According to Tadeusz Kowalik, the tensions concerning privatization need to be lessened; however, he does not know whether the minister will manage to achieve this. Privatization should be accelerated, but this process must be healthier than it has been so far.

According to Anna Fornalczyk, privatization depended on politics, it still does, and it will continue to depend on it; however, efforts will have to be made to eliminate it. In Poland, there is still not enough evaluation of privatization results; therefore, continuous monitoring [preceding word in English] must be established. Maria Jarosz believes that employees' partnerships should be looked upon as a transitional form; she adds that they should be allowed to look for capital and to concentrate on property.

Zofia Dobska fears that partial privatization—where the Treasury keeps some of the shares—is not being employed as much as it should be. In the meantime, as a result of the recession, which is felt not only in Poland, the prices that are arrived at in transactions are not really satisfactory. The lack of foreign capital should be explained by the fact that, in recent years, privatization in the postsocialist states has amounted to merely 5 percent of the global ownership transformations; 25 percent in Third World countries and 75 percent in developed countries [as published].

While answering questions, Minister Kaczmarek mentioned the possibility of supporting privatization through the emission of obligations, which could be converted into ownership titles, and the establishment of a system of credit pledges guaranteed by the state.

Upper Silesia's Economic Prospects Viewed

PM1101101894 Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA in Polish 30 Dec 93-2 Jan 94 p 4

[Article by Anna Wozniak: "Tiger on the Vistula? Upper Silesia's Future Rests on Winning Special Economic Zone Status"]

[Text] For a while now, the Western press has carried predictions of the expected emergence of a new "European Tiger." Previously, that aggressive title was reserved exclusively for the economies of such East Asian countries as Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and others. This time it is Poland's turn, and we find the news somewhat surprising, to say the least.

However, the Western observers' conclusion is drawn from the study of the Central Office of Planning [CUP] official economic forecast for the next four years, which includes a detailed prognosis for the next year. Minister Miroslaw Pietrewicz, who heads CUP, maintains that, over the next four years, we will be able to consolidate the economic growth that has already been noted, and even accelerate it. According to the forecast, the gross national product should grow at the rate of 4.2 percent per year, our exports by 5.5 percent, and public consumption by 14 percent. All of this should be accompanied by a 9-percent annual increase in capital investment. These projected figures are comparable with the indexes achieved by Asia's "economic tigers," and that fact gave rise to the aforementioned analogies, which are further reinforced by the proven accuracy of recent CUP forecasts.

Will the latest CUP prognoses be just as accurate? This depends first and foremost on our politicians and the policies they pursue—in other words, on precisely those factors that should not affect the economy. The latest CUP predictions were prepared during Hanna Suchocka's rule, whereas the task of their realization will be entrusted to the new government, commonly dubbed the government of the left. It has to be admitted that Prime Minister Pawlak and his ministers have pledged their intention of maintaining the direction of the reforms, including privatization and controlled inflation. However, voices have been heard heralding interventionist policies, which should encourage exports on the one hand and promote our own agriculture and industry on the other. A small measure of state intervention will not harm our interests, and privatization should be carried out avoiding unjust treatment of work forces in the process and at a slightly slower rate, according to the opinion of the government team and its economic advisers.

Only such nuances could now alter the accuracy of the forecasts. However, other economists see our aspirations to the title of "Europe's tigers" in bleaker terms. One of them, Andrzej Krzysztof Wroblewski, wrote in his paper, GAZETA BANKOWA, that the sight of the steadily shortening lines of people bringing their savings to banks and the correspondingly lengthening lines of company directors applying in the same banks to have their debts annulled filled him with pessimism. His pessimism was, according to him, an answer to the optimism of those who hope that the left-wing government will not expect people to work hard but will, instead, allow employers to pay them more. Such optimists see the supposed proof of

the correctness of their views in the government's decision to abolish the "popiwek" tax [on above-normative wages] on 1 April 1994.

Regular polls carried out by the Public Opinion Survey Center [CBOS] confirm a steady rise of popular optimism after the September election and the appointment of the new government. At the same time, CBOS analyses show that Polish people assess their material situation as rather modest. However, compared with the situation prevailing 18 months ago, they appear to have a stronger sense of material security. This opinion should be modified by adding that the relevant polls were carried out toward the end of November, so their respondents could not have known the scenario of the December "packet" of price rises announced for the coming year. An avalanche of these price increases is due to be triggered on the last night of the year and will hurtle onward right through until December 1994. The draft budget approved on Christmas Eve assumed a 27-percent increase in the prices of consumer goods and services! To make matters worse, forecasts concerning the situation in the labor market are hardly any better. It is expected that unemployment will continue to grow throughout 1994 and that, in four years' time, it could still be only 5 percent lower than in 1994.

No one is a prophet in his own country, and that is perhaps why Western observers perceive our chances in a more optimistic light—starting with Professor Jeffrey Sachs and ending with Western businessmen, who recently seem to be somewhat more inclined to invest in Poland than they appeared before. They all agree that the obvious continuing modernization of our infrastructure, from the banking system through the communications system to the construction of freeways, speaks in favor of treating us with such new confidence, as does the continuing growth tendency noted in our economy.

Unfortunately, prospects for the Katowice Voivodship appear rather black against that optimistic background picture. Such neighboring voivodships as Bielsko-Biala and Czestochowa have recorded a steady increase in their sold output, so they enjoy rather hopeful expectations and forecasts. However, the region of [Upper] Silesia will not be able to activate its economic potential by itself, considering its lack of gross profit-making capacity, the extent of its debt liabilities, and the absence of credit-generating capacity on the part of the majority of the giant state enterprises representing predominantly such branches of heavy industry as mining and the metallurgical industry. This absence of a growth potential in [Upper] Silesia will persist even in the case of a hypothetical economic boom enjoyed by the rest of the country. This is because—as we will remember—according to an analysis prepared a while ago by the EEC of the development prospects of Poland's individual regions, Upper Silesia is treated as a moribund industrial zone. This is bad news for the region's rating as regards its potential for attracting foreign investors. That is why its future depends, among other things, on whether the Katowice Voivodship manages to win the status of a

special economic zone. Unfortunately, Warsaw and its power centers are not at all eager to accord it such a status.

As we can see, the answer to the question "What will 1994 be like for us?" will depend on a great many factors. Some of those will be external factors that we cannot influence ourselves. Nevertheless, our country should by no means be regarded as a peripheral area of Europe, and such developments as stemming the recession in the West, securing lasting peace in the world (and especially in Europe), shaping correct relations with our neighbors, and the unveiling of Russia's war doctrine will not be irrelevant to our condition and our assessment of our situation in the coming year.

Will a new "tiger" be born in Europe? And will it be a "Polish tiger"? The question remains open, but even the fact that it has been posed bodes well for us. Who would have dared to come up with such a prospect as recently as two years ago?

BBC Interest in Setting Up Polish News Agency

AU1301192794 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 12 Jan 94 p 3

[Article by Agnieszka Kublik: "BBC Idea on News Agency in Poland"]

[Text] British public television, the BBC, wants to create a news agency in Poland called "Independent Television News [Niezalezne Wiadomosci Telewizyjne NW-TV]," which would compete with the Television Information Agency [TAI].

The BBC has already approached Polsat, the satellite television channel, with an offer to form a company in this regard. "Polsat holds a broadcasting license, and the BBC does not work with pirates," said BBC Polish section chief Eugeniusz Smolar, explaining this move.

The agency's offices would be in Warsaw, and it would be financed by all of the television channels belonging to it. The agency would function as a joint-stock company, whose controlling shares would belong to the BBC. "Polsat would like to have most of the shares," Polsat chief Boguslaw Chrabota admitted.

The BBC's idea is as follows. The new agency would produce and supply Polish private television channels with several news programs daily, plus footage on political, economic, social, and cultural events.

In addition, the BBC is offering the Poles their own "BBC World Service" program, British television news footage, assistance in setting up NW-TV's Warsaw offices, and training for Polish reporters.

Smolar warns, however, that these are only working proposals, and everything is yet to be decided between the BBC and the eventual partners.

"We want to create a strong alternative to Polish television news," says Smolar. "The reason that British television is so good is that it has strong competition. In Great Britain, ITN [Independent Television News] competes with the BBC. ITN is a kind of news agency of the private television channels, which share a common information service."

The commercial channels to whom the BBC offer is addressed have still not reached a decision. Mirosław Chojecki of NTP Plus, which is seeking a license for

nationwide Polish television, told us that "he does not know enough about this idea." But he realizes that it would be cheaper to use the NW-TV service than create one's own news agency.

At Nicola Grauso's Polonia 1 channel, which is currently setting up a network of over a dozen local stations, we were told that each station must decide for itself whether it wants to cooperate with the BBC. The Warsaw-based NTW, which is part of Grauso's network, does not yet know whether it will buy the idea.

Ministry Spokesman Welcomes 'Partnership'

AU1201192594 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 12 Jan 94

[Text] During a news conference held today, Mircea Geoana, the spokesman of Romania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, saluted the proposal for a Partnership for Peace that has been accepted by Romania's president as a precursory step of our country's joining NATO as a full member.

The declaration presented by Geoana says that the Foreign Affairs Ministry will forward proposals to the government recommending that necessary official steps should be urgently taken in view of launching the Partnership for Peace and to sign the proposed document.

West's Attitude Toward Bucharest Condemned

AU1401104794 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 11 Jan 94 p 1

[Article by Ilie Serbanescu: "An Awful Triumph"]

[Text] Whether we realize it or not, these days Romania is going through one of the most turbulent moments of its history. For a short while, after the 1989 December events (about which we did not know much at the time they occurred) we believed we would be able to start living a normal life, escape from uncivilized poverty and an aberrant international isolation in an era of the most acute "shrinking" of the planet, due to the impact of the formidable progress made in the field of electronics and telecommunication. We had signs long ago that this aspiration was but an illusion (and, in a tragic way, not long after that significant December 1989). But now we are absolutely sure of it. The West has dealt a mortal blow to the Romanians. Or, at least to the naive people who believed that ultimately, salvation from the West would reach us. The West has robbed Romanians of hope.

We can advance toward a normal life only through our own efforts and with the indispensable assistance of those we saw living a normal life, that is, the West. It is difficult to evaluate the percentage, but most probably at least half of the contribution must belong to us. That is, we have to start living a normal life, to work hard and become productive, to get seriously organized in order to become efficient, and to be merciless with ourselves in order to be able to confront successfully an equally merciless international competition that characterizes the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the third millennia. We also have to be aware of the fact that the values of democracy and the market economy must be promoted because we indeed need them, and not because somebody somewhere asks us to do so. The second half of the contribution in the aforementioned proportion was expected to come from the West. And a contribution of 50 percent is still not an exaggeration, because this would not have meant immediate money and advice, but rather the adequate political pressure

that would direct us, and even drag us if necessary, toward a normal life in those many cases and situations in which the old mentalities and structures fiercely opposed it. Currently the West is announcing officially, even if it maintains a screen of bare words, that Romania is not part of its world. NATO is officially declaring that it has no intention of guaranteeing security for the former communist countries from the new Russian empire, guarantee that cannot exist in reality except if these countries join NATO. But there is something else even more tragic! If such an admission to NATO takes place, this will be achieved in two phases: first the "Central European" countries and never the "East European" countries. The American president who came to Europe to sanction the policy of the West toward the East, communicated to this to Romania through the fact that after his stay in Central Europe he flew directly to Moscow. If we acknowledge the American thesis, namely that Mr. Clinton did not stop in Prague to seal Central Europe's blessing and excommunicate East Europe, then, there can be only one, even more annoying interpretation, for this discriminatory visit as far as Romania's aspirations are concerned. Mr. Clinton went there to appease those who not only thought that the West will help them to emerge from their "eastern condemnation" but also did all they could to change themselves and receive the alms and assistance of the West.

It is clear now that there was no question of Romania's admission even being discussed at all. Those who believed that the West's reticence toward Romania was due to the leadership in Bucharest were mistaken. The reality was exactly the opposite. The leadership structure in Bucharest is the way it is precisely because Romania was not considered even for a moment as part of the Western sphere but as part of the Russian sphere. Those who believed that the West would not indefinitely accept that the old structures remain unchanged in Romania and the reform aimed at a market economy has not been implemented, were naive people. The reality is that the West was less than marginally interested in our country, because Romania was not and will not be part of its world.

Those who led our destinies—probably were aware of this—through the current official NATO decision, experience these days a real triumph. They can prove now that Romania's association to the Western world does not take place not because of them, that is, because of the communist restoration or the blocking of the reform, but because of the West itself, which has showed that it does not want us. As a matter of fact, they did their duty formally and advanced the request to join the NATO, when it was clear that in no way can such a thing come into question. The excommunicatory treatment applied to Romanians—who, contrary to the Central Europeans, are considered in the West as people from the other side of the fence—is a shattering additional argument for the "Eastern" statute of Romania.

What else can the Romanians do? The ideal reaction—or better said idealistic reaction—would be if they obstinately progressed on the path of democracy and of market economy in spite of the leadership in Bucharest which is not really in favor of it. In a way, it would be a case of promoting a “pro-Western” attitude without the West. These are impossible prospects because we did not do it before, not even when it was believed that the West is with us!

Iliescu Meets French Army Chief of Staff

AU1301213494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 13 Jan 94

[Text] This evening, Romania's President Iliescu received the chief of staff of the French Army Jacques Lanxade, who is currently paying an official visit to our country.

Cooperation between Romania and France in the military area and in other areas of joint interest were the major issues of discussion.

After the meeting, Mr. Jacques Lanxade told the journalists the following: Together with the president of the republic [as heard], who did me the honor of receiving me, we first discussed cooperation between France and Romania in the areas of security and defense, and then we surveyed the situation in Europe in general and in this region in particular. And finally, we discussed the evolution of security structures in Europe after the NATO summit in Brussels.

The French guest also said: I can say that the relations between Romania and France in all spheres, and particularly in the area of defense, are very dynamic, very warm, and are based on history. We resumed these contacts more than two years ago and we are expecting to develop them. I am very optimistic that we will manage to accomplish durable things together.

Answering the question of what his opinions about Romania are currently, Jacques Lanxade said: I believe that Romania is making efforts to restore a difficult economic situation, a situation with which other countries are also currently confronted, countries that have changed their situation in recent years. Romania is seeking to make its actions felt in the international community and is developing cooperation with several countries. I believe that Romania is a country in which much hope can be laid.

Asked whether he has visited Romania before, he answered: I know Romania only a little, because I arrived only this morning and will start visiting it tomorrow. But I arrived here mainly to work.

Previously, the French Military delegation was also received by Romania's national defense minister, Lieutenant General Nicolae Spiroiu. The latter briefed the

guest about the actions taken to restructure and modernize the Romanian Army and to achieve the competitiveness of this army with the armies of the countries that have a long democratic tradition. The sides exchanged views on ways to ensure security and preserve stability and peace in Europe and throughout the world.

The sides also revealed the joint wish to develop bilateral relations in the interest of the two armies.

Tonight, the French military delegation was also received by the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Theodor Melescanu.

Iliescu Thanks Turkish Minister for Support

AU1301142494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 13 Jan 94

[Excerpt] This morning Romania's President Ion Iliescu received Turkish Health Minister Kazim Dinc. During the first minutes of the meeting, which was also attended by the press, the head of the Romanian state asked his guest to convey his thanks to Turkish President Suleyman Demirel for his letter in connection with [expressing support for] Romania's wish to join NATO structures. President Ion Iliescu also expressed his satisfaction concerning the materialization of certain joint actions that had been agreed with President Suleyman Demirel, which are beneficial for both nations.

For his part, the Turkish minister said that he was the bearer of messages conveying regards from the president and the prime minister of his country. [passage omitted]

PSM Leader Discusses Requirements for Ruling

AU1101211594 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 5 Jan 94 p 5

[Interview with Tudor Mohora, vice president of the Socialist Party of Labor, by Peter Sragher; place and date not given: “The PSM Does Not Wish To Resume the Construction of Socialism”]

[Text] [Sragher] County conferences of the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM] are currently taking place and are meant to prepare the congress of the party due at the beginning of this year. I thought that it would be interesting to find out the political opinion of Mr. Tudor Mohora, one of the leaders of this party, regarding this issue.

Mr. Mohora, you affirmed that the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] called itself a social-democratic party, thus a left-center party, which is ruling with right-wing measures. How can you support a different party in parliament and a different cabinet?

[Mohora] We are in a somehow different situation today than right after the September 1992 elections. A possible answer to your question might be that, when we decided to support the ruling party, we took into consideration its

program and the political signals that they released during the electoral campaign.

Today, we have a certain critical attitude toward the government, the act of ruling itself, and our criticism ended in a simple motion, which however we could not promote further. After one year of ruling, we can no longer talk about declarations of intent, but we can talk about the act of governing, which has unfolded for long enough for us to have a proper picture of it.

[Sragher] If the PDSR is ruling with right-wing measures, some of your voters are claiming that they should better allow the opposition to govern. How real does the possibility of the opposition's governing seem to you?

[Mohora] I have studied the program and situation of the opposition carefully. Having a complete belief in the democratic system that we are currently building in our country, not only I do not exclude it, but I even believe that it is desirable that, in certain phases, the opposition should have a chance to govern. Unfortunately—it is not I who judges them, but public opinion itself passes a judgment—currently the opposition does not have a coherent picture of an economic and social construction. It is known that, although in the last part of this century there have been certain converging elements between the liberal and the social-democratic perspectives, both as doctrines and as pictures of the society, however, they stay far apart.

[Sragher] You criticize the heterogeneous character of the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania]. The PRM [Greater Romania Party] has only a national doctrine, just like the PUNR [National Romanian Unity Party], which, however, very recently called itself neoliberal, following the example of the PDAR [Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania], which, however, also assumes the agrarian doctrine. How homogeneous and viable is a possible future agreement with the parties that have such different ideologies?

[Mohora] Well, certainly your question is very interesting and at the same time very difficult, but I believe that the answer to this question can be found in the responsibility and the idea of compromise that should govern us when we accept such a political alliance. The parties that you have mentioned might be criticized just like we can be criticized for certain aspects or, probably, for certain limitations in our policy. However, we have the following concept: We should be open and the democratic system requires—if we understand the basic rule of democracy, which is ultimately a sublimation of tolerance—that, if needed, one can set up alliances even with parties—and such thing has already happened throughout history in Romania—that are on the other side of the barricade. We have constantly said that we must be open and discuss issues regarding our country with all parties, regardless of their orientation, including the right-wing parties.

[Sragher] Do you have a national unity government in mind?

[Mohora] Yes, I do. As long as there are people outside our country's borders who are observing—maybe from a more neutral position, that is, they are more detached from the political excitement—that here one might reach—and it is high time to reach—an agreement on principles and on rules regarding major issues in the domestic and foreign policy of our country, that can be accepted by all of us. I believe that this would lead to the idea of a national unity government.

[Sragher] Suppose tomorrow you become prime minister. What would be the first three major measures taken by you in order to solve the current crisis of our country?

[Mohora] First of all a strong government is required. It should be strong both in the area of professional competence and in its moral force and the honesty of the people it includes, as well as in its team spirit. I believe that the PSM could form a strong government. It would need not only three, but a whole set of measures. First of all, those government decisions and those laws should be adopted and promoted that would put order in the public sector. If the government and society have such an important public sector, it should not be left—as it has happened so far—unattended. A second issue would refer to the real stimulation of the private sector. Currently I believe that there are no appropriate conditions, neither legislative nor governmental ones, that would enable a small entrepreneur to start a business and be successful. Currently, a monopoly and a banking system have been established, which are a wizardry that pumps very important funds into firms that, in most cases, do not have a productive character, but rather a character of financial-banking and commercial profiteering. The third measure: Precisely the team that I was talking about should start a merciless war against corruption. This affliction that I believe continues to expand is—to say the least—tolerated by the current leadership. This would mean to put order in the police and justice system. We can put our own house in order by persistently implementing daily measures and actions. In fact, our country has reached such a dramatic situation that, as a matter of fact, a concrete anti-crisis program should be adopted by a government that would have all fields of activity in mind.

[Sragher] Does the PSM believe that the construction of socialism should resume?

[Mohora] No. The PSM believes that we should establish the state of law because, in our program, we recognized and included, without any reticence, the provisions of Romania's Constitution. However, we should make sure that this establishment of the state of law serves the national interests, namely the reform, our integration in European structures, etc. and should be in Romania's favor. Secondly, the ordinary citizen should detect and perceive this state of law as a major advantage compared to the past regime. Unfortunately, one cannot say that, according to the way things have developed in the past

four years, the citizen feels more protected or a greater social and legal, or even physical, security than before.

[Sragher] In what way did you support the idea of privatization?

[Mohora] From the very beginning, we agreed to privatization in agriculture and in the sphere of services, which should be much more developed, in commerce, and tourism. But privatization can be done in all areas—apart from the energy system, telecommunications, transportation, and the defense industry—on the basis of economic profitability and the privatization process should even be speeded up.

[Sragher] Do you believe that the Euro-Atlantic integration is a positive act?

[Mohora] We have spoken out without reticence in favor of integration in the European structures, both in the political area as well as economic and cultural areas. Those who believe that the PSM wishes to find answers for the renewal of the Romanian society in other regions of the world are greatly mistaken. We do not see integration under all circumstances, but rather under conditions that should really serve Romania. We desire a position of dignity and equity in relations with the countries that are members of the European Union's structures and also a real promotion of our interests on essential, cardinal issues such as integration into the NATO structures.

As far as foreign bases are concerned, our position is on this issue is that the Romanian Parliament and the Romanian people should be consulted. These are not issues that belong exclusively to the government or the president.

[Sragher] Can we understand that currently the PSM would oppose the deployment of NATO bases on Romanian territory?

[Mohora] In the leadership of our party we have not established a position regarding NATO. However, I could not say that now, if Romania were invited to enter NATO structures, the PSM would certainly oppose such

actions. We would decide about it after we took into account the respective circumstances at the time when such a proposal is made. Because the balance of forces certainly will be different in six months time or a year's time and the geostrategic picture will also be different. There is no point in discussing now how we would relate to such an issue. We cannot be against integration in a security system that would be to our advantage.

As far as our position on a foreign basis is concerned, we have a determined position: We do not wish the deployment of foreign bases on our country's territory.

[Sragher] Do you believe that Romania's joining or not joining a security system also depends on Russia? How do you regard the new political games after the announcement of the military doctrine and the strengthening of the army after the October coup?

[Mohora] I believe that one should not ignore the warnings that Russia is launching toward all countries that formerly were part of the "cordon sanitaire" between it and the Western world, when it demands that no political-military alliances should be established that might be directed against it.

Russia believes that every alliance in Europe in which it is not included is directed against it or in some way opposing it. In fact, this is an old political concept. The more so since Russia had and continues to have a global vision about foreign policy and cannot give up and will not be able to give in the future either—except maybe under certain circumstances—this idea.

A healthy policy in this respect would be if Romania adopted a very prudent attitude on the issue of military integration and security structures, that are still not consolidated. We can see that the situation of establishing relations in this area is still vague. Forcing for example the issue of integration in military structures might create in the future reactions and might mark our relations with our very powerful neighbors, which possess the nuclear weapon and which, even if they currently face economic difficulties, still hold the statute of great military powers. And this might be harmful to our country's interests.

Silajdzic Threatens To Cancel Geneva Talks*AU1401164894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Jan 94*

[Excerpts] There was a festive session held in Sarajevo today to mark the repelling of one of the strongest offensives in the 1st Corps' operational zone. The session was attended by Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankic, [names indistinct], heads of the Executive Council and Assembly of the City of Sarajevo. Those fighters of the 1st Corps who had contributed most to the repelling of the enemy offensive were presented with the appropriate decorations. Here is a report by [name indistinct]

[Correspondent] At the beginning of the session, the fighters and their officers were addressed by Brigadier (Ismet Dahic), deputy commander of the 1st Corps. He stressed that the fighters had been prepared for the enemy offensive, which started on 21 December, and that despite 40,000 shells fired and the fact that Chetnik [word indistinct] units took part in these battles, the fighters of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the end turned the situation to their advantage.

After that (Dahic) presented decorations to the members of the brigades whose fighters took part in these battles on behalf of the Corps commander. They will be handed to them subsequently. [passage omitted]

We have reached the half-way stage, Foreign Minister Ljubijankic said. The other half could be even more difficult, but what we have done so far compels us to go further.

Finally, the fighters were addressed by Prime Minister Silajdzic, who was greeted with a long applause. He conveyed to the fighters greetings from President Izetbegovic, who was unable to attend. Speaking about the future of the Geneva talks, Silajdzic stressed that if the aggressor continues to destroy Sarajevo and other towns and to kill civilians during the Geneva talks, the talks will not be held.

There is certain fear abroad of a republic in which the Muslims would constitute a majority, Silajdzic said. That this fear is not founded is best illustrated by the conduct of the members of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the territories under their control. People of other nationalities are not being expelled. Places of worship are not being destroyed. Only criminals should be afraid of such an army, Silajdzic said.

This was a brief summary of what was said at today's festive session organized to mark the repelling of a fierce enemy offensive.

Izetbegovic Wants United, Non-Islamic State*LD1301193594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1615 GMT 13 Jan 94*

[Text] Sarajevo, 13 January (TANJUG)—The President of the Muslim Presidency in Sarajevo, Alija Izetbegovic,

has spoken of further armed struggle for a united Bosnia-Herzegovina and the survival of Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At a session late last night in Sarajevo, the Party of Democratic Action [Stranka Demokratske Akcije—SDA] elected its new organs and leadership. Addressing the session he said that "everything is different now" because his forces number 200,000 soldiers. The SDA leader said that the war in Bosnia would continue until the Serbs gave up all the territories which had been predominantly populated by Muslims before the outbreak of the conflict.

Advocating again an undivided Bosnia, Izetbegovic admitted openly for the first time that the Muslims had organized themselves for armed secession from Yugoslavia ten months before the outbreak of war on 6 April 1992. "I would like to recall a meeting in the Police Hall in Sarajevo on 10 June 1991 attended by 380 people from the entire former Yugoslavia and the declaration we issued then, ten months before the beginning of the war. In that declaration we heralded the beginning of Bosnia-Herzegovina's armed defense."

Izetbegovic said that the Muslims ought to continue along this path while opening up the party to members of other peoples. The SDA should admit all those who are willing to fight for Bosnia-Herzegovina, he said. In his view the main criterion for membership is "whether or not someone has remained loyal to the people" referring obviously to the Muslim people he leads.

Despite the fact that a vast majority of Serbs and Croats have opted for their independent republics, Izetbegovic said for the umpteenth time that they, too, ostensibly wanted a united Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"There is no united Bosnia without the Serbs and Croats as all the Muslims, most of the Croats and a considerable number of Serbs want a united Bosnia-Herzegovina", he said. "There are two stages of struggle. The one phase of struggle for Bosnia's integration is of a military nature, the other is political. I used to quote that poet of ours who said: 'By God we swear we shall not be slaves.'"

At the same time Izetbegovic commented on the claims that he wanted to create an Islamic republic.

"I am telling you clearly here that I am not in favor of an Islamic republic. Yet, I do want Islam to survive in these lands. We want to remain what we are. I do not know why we should do this. We illustrate here, European Islam. We illustrate a kind of modern Islam", he said.

"To this end we can do a great deal for both the East and West," the leader of Muslims said in conclusion and added that they would try to achieve this as democrats.

Karadzic, Tudjman Confederation Proposals Viewed

AU1301211494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Jan 94

[Text] As the Press Center of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina reports, after Franjo Tudjman's Bosnian initiative on the confederation of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the war criminal Radovan Karadzic has made it public that he is also considering coming out with a proposal on a confederation of all states that have appeared in these regions. Let us recall that the last attempt to save peace on the territory of former Yugoslavia was the initiative of Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kiro Gligorov, president of Macedonia, on forming a confederation of south Slav states.

The greater state appetites of Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, and the desire of the citizens of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia to break free from the Belgrade Bolshevik hegemony then came into direct confrontation. The former Yugoslav People's Army was used as the fiercest defender of such a hegemony, simply because it was the only guarantor of the high standard of living for its officers and of the high budget earmarked for the Army.

The war criminal Radovan Karadzic, if this is his idea, is too late in starting to think independently, and if he is still a mere mouthpiece for Milosevic's ideas, he is then offering us one more deceit, the umpteenth prison of the South Slav peoples. After they themselves broke up the now already former Yugoslavia, after hundreds of thousands of people have been killed in war, after expelling, displacing, or forcing the emigration of more than 2 million people, after destroying the economies of all these states and everything that people painstakingly achieved over years, the value of which is estimated to tens of billions of dollars, they now realize they cannot live without us.

They have realized this even before, but they expected to achieve their domination with force, arms, and the sowing of fear. Along with the fear, they have sown hatred, distrust, and evil. Just as the force and all the weapons they have stolen from us failed to help them, just as they have not managed to frighten, conquer, or destroy us, they also failed to implant hatred or to force us to answer crime with crime. We are ready to build confidence among people and nations—in fact, we have never given it up—and we are going to build it. However, in doing so we must be careful, at least not to form a union with those people who initiated genocide and made a large part of Serbian people commit it, or at least not oppose it. We could even try with somebody else and somebody different.

In August 1992, there was an initiative for a confederation of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Croatia. Had a true military alliance between those states been established then, Serbian fascism would have already been defeated

and the conditions created for establishing confidence among peoples and states, and even for establishing the principles of a possible confederal agreement. However, somebody who has several times already saved Milosevic's fascism from a complete defeat, as Tudjman has done, deserves equal suspicion, and his initiatives also.

Muslims Reportedly Fire From UN Barracks

LD1301211694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1921 GMT 13 Jan 94

[Text] Bratunac, Jan 13 (TANJUG)—The Moslems Thursday [13 January] fired on Serb positions from the Jusuf Dzonlic barracks in Sarajevo which also house some of the UN peacekeepers, in an obviously attempt to have the Serbs blamed for an attack on UNPROFOR if they answer back, Serb military sources report.

All Serb suburbs and Serb positions in the Sarajevo area were shelled by Moslems, the same sources state. Moslem forces in the region of the Moslem enclave Gorazde (eastern Bosnia) continue provocations with anti-aircraft and infantry weapons in the direction of the Serb positions, mainly in the direction of Foca.

Moslem artillery also shelled Serb positions and civilian targets in the region of Doboj (north Bosnia) in the region of Srbobran and Gradacac (central Bosnia) on the Bihac-Krupa line (northern Bosnia), and around Kladanj and Olovo (central Bosnia). In the four-day clashes near Olovo the Serb forces Thursday afternoon succeeded in repulsing the Moslem forces who were heading towards the town itself.

Minister Protests Shelling of Sarajevo Hospital

LD1401002794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2300 GMT 13 Jan 94

[Text] Sarajevo's state hospital was today hit by three 120-mm artillery projectiles for the fourth time this year. A letter from Bosnia-Herzegovina Defense Minister Hamdija Hadzihanovic to General Briquemont, commander in chief of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] for Bosnia-Herzegovina, says five people staying in the hospital were seriously wounded and one was killed in the immediate vicinity of the hospital. Given the 500 direct artillery hits in 1992 and the 15 in 1993, it seems, if the current rate of shelling is anything to go by, that this year's shelling will exceed the level achieved in the first year of war.

Mr. General, you know well that the state hospital in Sarajevo is a civilian facility and you are also aware of its importance. This is why we lodge once again our sharpest protest over this crime by the Serbian aggressor, which you are quietly observing and logging. The Bosnia-Herzegovina defense minister ends his letter by saying: I call on you to react to such attacks in an adequate manner.

Bosnian Croats Block Humanitarian Convoy*LD1301215994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1645 GMT 13 Jan 94*

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 13 (TANJUG)—Representatives of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Sarajevo reported Thursday [13 January] that forces of the Bosnian Croat army HVO, have for the past two days been holding up a humanitarian convoy bringing aid to Bosnian Moslems in Maglaj, northern Bosnia.

They reported, according to AFP, that the column of nine trucks with food and medicine is blocked in Novi Seher, 10 kilometers from Maglaj, and that the UN representative Larry Hollingworth is negotiating its passage with the local HVO commanders. They also said that the Bosnian Serb forces allowed the convoy to pass through their territory without any problems. UNHCR representatives in Sarajevo also warned about the extremely difficult position of the 40,000 civilians in Maglaj since the last convoy arrived there on October 25 last year.

Appeals Sent From Tuzla on Food Situation*AU1301170094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 13 Jan 94*

[Report by Salih Brkic from Tuzla]

[Text] Dramatic appeals have been sent from Tuzla to Split and other seats of the UNHCR organization, to improve, finally, the quality of aid for people and refugees accommodated in Tuzla. The UNHCR working meeting is taking place in Split. The letters sent by Izet Hadzic, Tuzla District governor, Prof. Dr. (Sean) Avdic, government official in charge of aid to the people of northeastern Bosnia, and Tuzla Mayor Selim Beslagic, specifically point to the possibility of a tragedy befalling the population in the Tuzla District. The top officials of the Tuzla District and Commune are asking the UNHCR whether 632,000 people, including 236,000 refugees and approximately the same number of social cases, can survive January with the 1,345 tonnes of food that is to be brought to the large free territory of Tuzla District in the form of humanitarian aid.

Can one survive January with 3.26 kg of food including 2.5 kg of flour? And there is only one in three chances of that happening, people from Tuzla say.

The UNHCR has recorded several cases of starvation in Tuzla District, as well as dozens of suicides as a consequence of mental derangement, exhaustion, poverty, and hunger.

All this has prompted representatives of the 14 communes of the region of northeastern Bosnia to decide jointly to refuse the plan offered by the UNHCR, and to propose to the war presidencies of their respective communes that humanitarian aid be refused as of 18 January if the UNHCR fails to consider the possibility of increasing humanitarian aid to Tuzla District.

At the same time, the peaceful protests, thus far, of refugees in front of the UNHCR (?agency) are more noticeable. According to district and communal authorities, the situation is being kept under control despite all the ordeals to which the population is exposed.

In his letter, Tuzla Mayor Selim Beslagic also says that convoys are not arriving in Tuzla District this month; soup kitchens and refugee hostels have food for only five more days, hospitals and orphanages for only two more days.

All of this signifies yet more political pressure on the Bosnian delegation on the eve the continuation of Geneva talks; we therefore demand that a decision on unrestrained movement of humanitarian convoys toward Tuzla be made, along with the establishment of UN entities that would guarantee the security of the convoys, state the Tuzla authorities.

Serbian Advance Pierces Muslim Lines at Olovo*LD1301144994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1344 GMT 13 Jan 94*

[Text] Olovo, Nisici, 13 Jan (TANJUG)—Following unprecedented four-day fighting, members of the Combined Brigade of the Herzegovina Corps this morning managed to pierce Muslim defense lines in several parts of the Olovo battlefield [50 km north of Sarajevo on Sarajevo-Tuzla road], the brigade command has announced. Some Muslim units have been cut off following an unstoppable advance by Serb infantry and tank forces, and they are currently surrounded. These units keep asking for help from Tuzla which has not arrived because of severed communications. A large number of Muslim soldiers are leaving the battlefield in panic fleeing toward Olovo. The Muslim population from Krusevo and other villages near Olovo is already fleeing toward Tuzla.

The Muslim defeat can neither be helped by three rows of bunkers deeply dug in and covered by planks and earth by which Olovo and neighboring villages are surrounded. In the bloody four-day conflicts near Olovo, four members of the Combined Brigade of the Herzegovina Corps have been killed, while a few fighters have been wounded, three of them seriously. In the fighting today, up to the time when this dispatch was sent, the Serb side had not suffered any losses.

Croat Forces Commander: No Accord With Muslims*LD1401111394 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2235 GMT 13 Jan 94*

[Studio interview with Colonel General Ante Roso, commander of the Croatian Defense Council, HVO, by unidentified correspondent in Siroki Brijeg; from the "Picture vs. Picture" program—live]

[Excerpts] [Correspondent] Dear viewers, it is my pleasure to welcome for the first time this evening our guest on the "Picture vs. Picture" program, Mr. Ante Roso, commander of the Croatian Defense Council, who is in the studio in Siroki Brijeg. Good evening, General Roso.

[Roso] Good evening, Madam.

[Correspondent] Welcome to "Picture vs. Picture."

[Roso] Thank you.

[Correspondent] If I am not mistaken, this is your first public appearance since you became HVO commander two months ago. Why have you waited so long?

[Roso] I was rather busy.

[Correspondent] General, you had a meeting yesterday with Gen. Rasim Delic, commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina forces, in order to agree upon the modalities of the cease-fire that should come into effect on 15 January. All that is in line with the Bonn agreement between Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic. What specifically did you agree on?

[Roso] It seems to me that many things have been interpreted wrongly. We have not agreed on anything. We are waiting for basic political documents, that is, certain specific political guidelines. Consequently, we only agreed that we can proceed to establish specific modalities of the cease-fire. Nothing else was agreed upon, and nothing was signed.

[Correspondent] President Izetbegovic indicated yesterday that he would not accept the Croatian president's proposal. Will that have an impact? What impact will it have on further cease-fire agreements?

[Roso] You see, as long as we are talking about the political behavior of the Muslim side, it is unpredictable. This means that I am not a prophet, and I cannot tell you exactly whether or not there will be a cease-fire, whether or not we will achieve anything because there is nothing concrete. We have nothing concrete on which to base our statements as to what is really going on for the public, or even for the Army and everyone else. It is very difficult to interpret such behavior.

[Correspondent] If I am not wrong, you had a meeting with Gen. Delic in Visoko on 17 December last year, and you agreed on a cease-fire that was to last from 23 December to 3 January. It was exactly then that the Muslims launched a fierce offensive on the Lasva valley. Can you comment on this and describe the situation now?

[Roso] You see, we only talked about things in Visoko last time. Nothing was signed, and there was no official document. All we asked for was to spend the Christmas and New Year holidays in peace. As you know yourself, that verbal agreement was not honored, and we drew specific conclusions from such behavior. We heightened combat readiness, and the HVO was then ready to

respond to any attack or surprise. We waited for the holidays and New Year in a state of readiness.

[Correspondent] What is the situation like now? Where is the fiercest fighting taking place?

[Roso] The situation now is relatively complex. Fighting is going on more or less everywhere—mainly in central Bosnia—where the intensity of armed clashes has reached a climax that could turn into a larger-scale escalation. More precisely, when I returned from Sarajevo yesterday, the Muslim army was continuing its offensive in the Vitez area from three directions, as well as against Novi Travnik. Thank God, all the attacks have been repelled, and the Croat nation, as well as the army, has retained its positions.

[Correspondent] General, some newspapers in Croatia are speculating about the fall of Vitez, the withdrawal of the HVO forces, and a possible fall of the arms factory in Vitez into the Muslims' hands. Is that possible?

[Roso] You see, talking about the fall of Vitez, I would like to tell those eggheads that they are a bit abstract. That is out of the question as long as we are alive here, and as long as there are Croats in central Bosnia. This is not only my own stubbornness, or my own determination, but the will of the people whom I have seen recently. I even had the honor to meet some of them. It is out of the question that a part of Croat territory where the Croats in central Bosnia live should be brought into question at all and at any moment. We will surely not only fight, but also keep control of the territory.

Concerning Vitez itself and the industrial plant, I personally issued a written order that the explosives factory in Vitez be destroyed if necessary, regardless of the consequences. Of course, we will take care of the people and so on, and provide maximal safety during such an operation. It is certain, however, that we will hand over the factory in one piece to no one other than the Croatian Defense Council. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Tell us, what is the role of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] in Bosnia-Herzegovina? To what degree are they impartial?

[Roso] You see, I personally believe that in such a complex environment as Bosnia-Herzegovina, ex-Bosnia-Herzegovina, is in, it is very difficult to treat everyone in a fair way. I perfectly understand that side. I think that UNPROFOR's neutrality is questionable. The contacts between the HVO and UNPROFOR are relatively fair. We honor what we have pledged to honor, which is the free passage of humanitarian convoys and certain relations of a more or less technical and military nature. We have had no other relations with them.

[Correspondent] There has been talk recently that the blue helmets could withdraw from Bosnia-Herzegovina. From the military point of view, what would happen if they did withdraw?

[Roso] In my opinion, if the UN forces withdraw from the territory that they are occupying now, nothing special would happen. That is my personal opinion. I am more than convinced that this is nothing spectacular, but simply a way of exerting pressure on all three sides.

I believe that it is not difficult to predict what would happen in the field if they withdrew.

[Correspondent] What, in your opinion, is the likelihood of NATO's military intervention?

[Roso] I think that is fiction. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Then, of course, the questions arise: How satisfied are you with the situation within the HVO ranks? Are there any groups which are evading your control? What kind of situation did you find when you took up your post, and what is it like now?

[Roso] You see, I usually say: an event is not a process; the situation is as it is; we cannot create everything at the same time and have a perfectly formed, elite army in legal and military terms. The army is being formed gradually; it is the reality of the people in this small area, the people who displayed more than just courage, who had to sacrifice a lot for this reality and freedom, and who are continuing to make sacrifices in a chivalrous and brave manner.

We are undergoing an administrative and legal reorganization of the armed forces on this part of Croatian territory. The HVO, like any other army, is embarking on its restructuring. The role of the commander, it seems to me, does not mean all that much. He only partially plays the role of an intermediary, while the army as a whole, as a culture, as a defense, is a whole process. It does not depend only on me, or on my successor or predecessor. The creation of the armed forces in the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna will take time, but it is an interesting period in the history of this people.

[Correspondent] Of course, journalists [words indistinct] that we lack information. But the fact is that there seems to have been some kind of information block recently, because, prior to Krizeljcevo Selo, the world was only concerned about the suffering of the Muslims but not of the Croats. What do you think about that?

[Roso] It is very simple. Justice can have a bad roll. Everybody seeks it, but nobody really wants it. It appears when someone needs it. These are certainly orchestrated topics with set scenarios, and that should not bother us too much. We had great difficulty in breaking the information blockade as regards the Croats, as always. We have too much experience with such things. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] I must not forget to ask you: What is happening with the HVO members in Sarajevo?

[Roso] The HVO members in Sarajevo have been disarmed and they are no longer—for the time being—an active official part of the HVO. You yourself know that

there are several versions of events, but there is one realistic—that they are completely disarmed and deprived of their rights as regards the Croatian national, ethnic body of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna.

[Correspondent] What is the likelihood—in your opinion and based on your experience so far—of re-establishing a military alliance between the Croats and the Muslims?

[Roso] This is a complex question. I think that no Croat today can give you a definitive answer. But everything is possible in human life and in the life of a country. For example, France and Germany were at war for centuries and today, as far as I know, they are relatively close allies.

I think that the time is not yet ripe to talk about an alliance. But we can talk about certain relations, at least human relations. We have to communicate, we have to live, we have to keep going further as a human community because others are observing us. Consequently, we will treat the Muslims as we would any other people.

[Correspondent] You are a soldier with truly rich military experience. From the military viewpoint, how do you anticipate developments and the military balance in the next few months?

[Roso] I think that the problem in Bosnia, particularly, and in Herzegovina, has to be taken very seriously for several reasons. One reason is that this is a question of the survival of our people, of the Croatian people, on its legal, historic, ethnic territory. We cannot raise any obstruction to this, apart from reality. [sentence as heard] We have to survive there. There is no Bosnia without the Croats. Everybody must understand this, and this must be completely clear to everyone.

[Correspondent] But the front is very large. Excuse me, will this be possible without the intervention of the military forces of the Republic of Croatia.

[Roso] We do not need the Croatian Army. I deeply respect it, but we have enough people and technical equipment and we know how to use it. We have technologically mastered the use of certain materials. We have certainly introduced some up-to-date military technology, some new types of equipment, and if necessary we will use it. I think that we have not yet reached that option, but I can guarantee this before God: We will use anything to preserve the Croatian people's territory in Herceg-Bosna.

Koljevic Threatens New 'Radical Step'

AU1301175594 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jan 94 p 4

[M.M. report: "Serbs Can Also Do It Differently...."]

[Text] The concessions that we have made so far, we made thinking that they were the price of peace. If it turns out that the Muslim and the Croatian sides indeed

do not want peace, we are prepared to make a different, radical step. We could retract the concessions. We are prepared for a solution that would lead to the end of the Bosnian crisis, either through war or peace.

This was stated for our paper by Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the republic of Srpska, commenting on the assembly's decision to postpone the adoption of the platform until its session in Bijeljina on 17 January, shortly before the meeting in Geneva. Stressing that the deputies at the Pale assembly session adhered to their earlier offer [33.3 percent of the territory for the Muslims], Dr. Koljevic said that the final platform was not adopted this time because of "a possibility of the Muslims and Croats reaching a new agreement."

"We certainly want the final settlement of the Bosnian crisis to be achieved peacefully, and we paid too high a price for peace, and yet it has not been established yet," Koljevic said. "This is thanks to the others, primarily to the Muslims. Serbs cannot be asked to do anything more, because while we were making certain concessions, new concessions were demanded, and the concessions that had been made earlier were quickly forgotten. These unjust concessions should finally be stopped."

Asked to comment on the latest threats to Serbs with military force, Dr., Koljevic said:

"Serbs have had enough of threats. Many responsible people are thinking incorrectly because they do not know Serbs, their history, and aspirations."

Defense Minister Views War in Bosnia

AU1301114794 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 31 Dec 93-6 Jan 94 p 3

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Defense Minister Hamdo Hadzihasanovic by Gordana Knezevic and Rasim Cerimagic; place and date not given: "We Have the Strength for a Just Peace"]

[Text] "There have been a lot of rumors about the kind of state we are creating. One of the reasons for this war is that we will no longer let others determine what our state will be like. It will be as our soldiers dream it should be—democratic—and all its citizens will live a dignified life. Whether a person is a Bosniak-Muslim, a Serb, a Croat, a Gypsy... and a person's religious and political affiliation will be a private matter. This will be a free country in which foreigners will also be able to come, make investments and stay. I would like to see the Japanese, Indonesians, Swedes, Dutch, Iranians... and all other people of good will settle here," said Hamdo Hadzihasanovic, defense minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in an interview for OSLOBODJENJE.

[OSLOBODJENJE] For a year this country did not have a defense minister. That speaks not only of the force of the aggression from outside but also of internal blockades and treason in order to thwart the defense of Bosnia.

[Hadzihasanovic] Let me remind you that, in the stage of preparing for the realization of the long-planned aggression, Bosnia-Herzegovina was effectively deprived of a leader. All those who understood what was going on here were, in various ways, rendered powerless and eliminated from political life. Immediately before the aggression, the entire leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina was destroyed through the "Agrokomerc" affair, and then also through Neum. For a long time we had many illusions and we still have some today. First of all, every one of us must defend the integrity of his or her own person and preserve his or her sanity. We must not allow our hate to influence our decisionmaking. It is crucial, for strengthening our defense, to rid ourselves of many illusions. First, was it possible to avoid the war? Yes, if we had surrendered. The process of our destruction would be milder and slower, but we would definitely be destroyed.

Second, are national parties responsible for the war? I am not a member of any party, but I claim they are not. The aggression was conceived before those parties were created, and they are just one of the means for making war.

Third, will there be an intervention and will they lift the arms embargo? There will not be a military intervention. We will have to do everything on our own. The embargo will get weaker as we get stronger. The embargo is like a drug: you become addicted, you must have weapons, but since they are forbidden and not everyone can sell them—they are very expensive.

Fourth, is there a war against the Bosniaks-Muslims and against Islam? Yes, this is also a crusade. But I do not want to emphasize that dimension, for that would only stimulate fascism, even in our own midst.

This is an imperialistic war for "greater Serbia." How else can we explain the killing of the Slovenes, Croats, the exile of the Hungarians...? After the aggression, according to the theory of closed systems, disintegration was increased here, to simplify—disorder and every conflict, from piling up garbage to criminal reprisals between the Croats and the Muslims, and among brothers. Those who need that created evidence that this is a religious and civil war.

However, I am sure that there is a Ram ["framework"—Belgrade plan to arm the Bosnian Serbs] for Milosevic's "ram." I think that the United States has a Ram both for Serbia, Russia, and Europe. Milosevic's chetniks have gone mad and are killing us, but as soon as they come to their senses, they will kill him too. Therefore, we must dispel our illusions, but that will not be painless. The fact that this country was, for so long, without a defense minister, is also a consequence of illusions. However, all the while, the deputy minister and his associates were working. People worked as much as they could in the circumstances. It is not up to me to evaluate their work. I look ahead and do everything to move forward.

Stronger by the Day

[OSLOBODJENJE] The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army was formed and became stronger in dramatic circumstances when they were defending their lives. Would you comment on its organization and strength today, almost two years after the aggression?

[Hadzihasanovic] The army, Ministry of the Interior, and other components of Bosnia-Herzegovina armed forces, were formed and became stronger in the most dramatic circumstances known to history. Wise and brave individuals and groups ("Patriotic Alliance," "Green Berets," and others) saw through the aggressor's intentions and offered organized resistance. Wherever there was organized resistance, the aggressor did not realize its intentions. This is a valuable experience and provides the foundation for the development of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

Today it is a great force. Educated, experienced, and with disciplined officers, a command headquarters and units. New officers are being educated as they fight. We have young soldiers coming to us. They use modern, sophisticated computer technology. The world, lead by the United States and West Europe, is afraid of the former Yugoslav National Army, and our army, whose hands are tied by the arms embargo, counters that force on its own and is successful in destroying it. It is high time we told the world that, although they interfere with us, we are helping them to destroy the fascist monster with the flesh and blood of our most outstanding sons....

[OSLOBODJENJE] Of course, demilitarization will soon make no sense?

[Hadzihasanovic] One of the illusions imposed on us that I failed to mention in answer to your first question is demilitarization. Is there anything more stupid and lethal than saying to our only real defense force, to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, in the middle of the war, that we will disband it as soon as we sign an agreement on peace. Fortunately, we have not dispelled that illusion. There will be no demilitarization as long as Serbia and Croatia have weapons.

That was just another deceit from the arsenal of special war, which was supposed to shake our faith in our own strength. The public often say that our soldiers are confused, that our goals are not clear, that the Platform of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency has been surpassed.... I do not think that is true. Our soldiers know they are fighting for freedom and justice for their people and for a STRONG BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA. We learned that, just as an illness attacks a body when its immune system is weakened, a war attacks a country when it gets weak, when its leadership is incomplete, and when its people are naive.

Prepared for the Worst

[OSLOBODJENJE] In the field, there are some individuals and groups that are not under a banner of Bosnia-Herzegovina, under the insignia and command of the army.

[Hadzihasanovic] We will energetically finish the process we began. They will either be placed under command of the army or they will be disarmed. Further development of our armed forces is based on a determinant that foresees the simultaneous occurrence of the worst possible factors for us: joint aggressors, withdrawal of the UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] and UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Forces], the embargo, and the winter. We benefit when any of those factors are missing.

All our soldiers know that the war will not end until we provide a minimum area for our survival and development. Until, in addition to access to the Sava, we establish a territorial link with eastern Bosnia, until we retrieve our territory in western Bosnia in which the Bosniak-Muslims form the majority, and until we gain access to the part of our coast at Neum—there will be no peace. If the aggressors do not sign to verify our intentions, we will have to use force to push them to those borders. Use only our force.

[OSLOBODJENJE] How do the government and your ministry intend to solve the problem of finances and logistic support to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army?

[Hadzihasanovic] The government and the Ministry of Defense are realizing many projects that will upgrade the system of financing, equipping, and supplying the armed forces. All sources of financing and goods are gradually being placed in the function of the state and defense. All republic funds have been abolished. The government finances the armed forces through the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Finance. The flow of information, money, and goods for corps and districts are clearly defined. We have recently issued instructions regulating that matter. We have also activated the inspectorate of the Ministry of Defense. Financing the armed forces from local sources must be abolished as soon as possible. That means we must do away with self-proclaimed home guard units and, at the same time, leave less room for autonomism. There are still some hidden stocks of goods. Our primary goal is to introduce stimulative measures to make businessmen sell those goods and start ordering and producing more goods. But we will also combine that with some repressive measures. All firms and other legal persons who will not accept concrete specifications for the scope and deadline of deliveries of goods, or who do not meet contractual obligations, will be shut down. At the same time, we are carrying out a revision of formations in army units. By activating businessmen we will create conditions for reducing the number of logistics personnel, and especially for those who pretend to be that. By increasing production we will also stimulate money transactions,

reduce municipality borders (customs duty), cut prices, destroy the black market, and eliminate criminals and the mafia, both domestic and international, often hiding behind humanitarian missions. Those are the prerequisites for breaking the chetnik and ustasha encirclements once and for all.

Until we upgrade money transfers, the families of dead Muslim heroes, soldiers and fighters, instead of worthless salaries, will get basic food products, firewood....

Iranian Paper Interviews Foreign Minister

NC1301161794 Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian
28 Dec 93 p 12

["Exclusive" interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubljankic with unidentified ETTELA'AT correspondent in Tehran; date not given]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [ETTELA'AT] How long will the Muslim officials of Bosnia-Herzegovina continue to stand up to the Serbs to recover 2 to 4 percent of their territory?

[Ljubljankic] We still demand the return of our occupied territory, in which massacres and ethnic hostilities continue. In fact, this is the demand of our parliament and we cannot concede it. On the basis of the Geneva conference and the peace proposals presented therein, the return of four percent of our territory to the Muslim areas is to ensure our interests and we cannot abandon it.

[ETTELA'AT] How do you view the Bihac adventurists in view of the situation currently prevailing in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Ljubljankic] Fikret Edic is a die-hard communist who has never defended Muslim interests. He is colluding with Bosnia's neighbors—the Serbs and Croats—to undermine the stamina of the Muslims at a time when Bosnia-Herzegovina is gasping in the throes of a life and death struggle.

Edic has reaped much profit in this manner, which he is now spending on catering to the needs of the rebels. This is an act of treason to the motherland and he is a traitor in our eyes. The Bosnian army is successfully defending Western Bosnia against the Serbs and the forces of the traitor Edic in most difficult conditions and we are trying to approach Edic's command base in Valica Klarosa [name as transliterated].

[ETTELA'AT] What is your assessment of the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the event of the division of the country into three ethnic parts? Will peace return to Bosnia-Herzegovina if such a partition takes place?

[Ljubljankic] Bosnia-Herzegovina has always been considered a culturally diverse society with much variety among the various minorities. Then, a century ago we saw the end of five centuries of Ottoman rule, which had been able to insure tolerance and coexistence among the religions. At present we are in a situation in which we are

forced to be realistic. There may be ethnic divisions, but that concept will not bring peace.

The basic condition of peace—that is, justice—has not been taken into consideration.

[ETTELA'AT] What is the best way of providing assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina in view of the arms embargo against your country?

[Ljubljankic] There is no other way to assist Bosnia-Herzegovina at this moment. The best way would be to provide financial assistance so that the country can strengthen its economy and purchase weapons.

[ETTELA'AT] What effect do the practical and theoretical stances of the Islamic countries, including that of the Islamic Republic of Iran, have on the enemies' aggression? What are Bosnia-Herzegovina's expectations of the world's countries and how do you feel these are being met?

[Ljubljankic] The Islamic countries are all endowed with growing economic power. We expect them to use this economic power to exert pressure on the Western countries so that the arms embargo imposed on us will be lifted. In every city of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are churches alongside the mosques. Unfortunately because of the fascist ideas of ethnic cleansing, all the mosques in the cities under Serb and Croat occupation have been destroyed.

The idea of dividing the country into ethnic regions is a new concept that never existed before in our country. We would prefer that Bosnia-Herzegovina retain its unique heritage in the world; this is quite a practical concept. [passage omitted]

If the arms embargo is lifted, we can solve our problems quickly. Even if this does not happen, politico-economic pressure would help boost the Muslims' stance at the peace talks.

[ETTELA'AT] The recent talks in Geneva and Brussels are the latest efforts to end the Bosnian crisis. In your opinion, will these be successful?

[Ljubljankic] The Geneva and Brussels talks give the European Union an opportunity to prove that those countries are sincere in doing something for Bosnia-Herzegovina on the political level. Unfortunately, the European countries are not able to motivate the Serbs to grant even a few concessions. Europe lacks the necessary ability and instruments to get these concessions; this is due to the absence of the political determination to use all necessary force.

The talks are not successful at present; they merely motivate the Serbs to perpetrate greater atrocities, so that the cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina are being shelled and civilians killed.

[ETTELA'AT] What is your opinion of the possibility of the Islamic Conference Organization [ICO] participating in the peace talks that are being held in Europe?

[Ljubljankic] This proposal, which was presented by the other sided at the peace talks, will not be accepted within the framework of the current talks.

Perhaps in the new talks this could get more consideration for Bosnia-Herzegovina, a totally new round of talks that should be based on documents by the United Nations and the CSCE. The ICO should influence the talks by using its political and economic power as leverage.

Muslims, Croats Clash at Vitez

94AE0061C London AL-HAYAH in Arabic
10 Jan 94 p 8

[Article by As'ad Taha in Zagreb and AL-HAYAH's London and Jeddah bureaus: "Bosnians Defeat Croats in Vitez on Eve of Begovic-Tudjman Talks"]

[Excerpts] Radio Zagreb has acknowledged that units of the Bosnian army succeeded at dawn yesterday, Sunday, in breaking through Croatian defense lines around the city of Vitez. They were able to gain control of the northeastern entry to the city. It added that the Muslims were able to cut the road linking Vitez and Busavaca, which is now completely besieged by the Muslims. [passage omitted]

Bosnian Progress

Croatian army sources have said that the broad Muslim offensive included Zepce, Busovaca, and Kiseljak, and that the Muslims had sent for a large number of their soldiers from the city of Zenta. It added that the British unit serving with the international forces had undertaken patrols on the road between Vitez and Busovaca to save refugees who had been forced to flee these areas.

AL-HAYAH escorted the first phase of this attack, in which the Muslims succeeded in placing the siege around Vitez and reaching its suburbs.

AL-HAYAH has learned from a military source that Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic met for five hours the day before yesterday with the commanders of the Bosnian army in the Konic region, and that the chief of staff, interior minister, and most senior military leaders took part in the meeting.

Map Shows Alleged Muslim Central Bosnia Offensive

94P20238A

[Editorial Report] The 4 January edition of the Split daily SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian publishes on page 3 a map the paper says was drafted by the Bosnian Army. The paper reports that the map, disclosing an offensive plan of the Bosnian Army, was

obtained by Croatian Defense Council (HVO) "intelligence circles." Based on the map, SLOBODNA DALMACIJA states, "it is obvious that the Muslim leadership of Sarajevo headed by Alija Izetbegovic has decided to destroy and expel the Croats from the Lasva Valley in central Bosnia," after which the Muslim forces would push through the Neretva Valley to the sea near Neum. The paper states that in order to carry out this plan, scheduled to begin on 3 January, the Muslims have concentrated in central Bosnia almost every corps of the Bosnian Army. The 303d Mountain Brigade of the 3rd Corps has been tasked with the first attack, directed against Vitez, SLOBODNA DALMACIJA states, adding that 5,000 soldiers of the 1st Corps from Sarajevo have already been sent toward Kiseljak, after which attacks on other Croatian enclaves are planned.

Correspondent Describes Fojnica Situation

94AE0061B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 9 Jan 94 p 7

[Article by As'ad Taha in Fojnica: "Muslims Prepare for Long War and Self-Reliance"]

[Excerpt] The first impression that any visitor to central Bosnia takes away with him is that the Muslims are preparing themselves for a long-term war of liberation, in which they are relying on their own resources. They have despaired of a Western or international position that might have enabled them to recover their territories, or given them the right to self-defense by lifting the arms embargo.

Despite the fact that everyone thinks of Sarajevo when speaking of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the central region is considered the heart of the Bosnian state, its principal nerve, and the center of the Muslim republic, after partition, for it has natural resources and strategic sites controlling the roads linking the parts of the country.

It was in this very region that Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic enjoys popularity that goes beyond his position as the symbol of the Bosnian Muslims in a unique historical period for them, during which they escaped the knives of the Serbs and Croats. Pictures of him have replaced those of former Yugoslav leader Josip Tito, who just a few months ago still presided over government offices and official institutions, with poems and popular songs praising and singing about him.

The speech he gave during his tour through this region a few weeks ago was accorded great importance by the man in the street—in it, he promised that the Bosnian army would soon move from a defense phase to a liberation phase—especially as it coincided with news, spread unofficially and unannounced, about the achievement of military progress on the military fronts with both the Croats and the Serbs.

For example, a week never passes without military units of the Bosnian army succeeding in pushing back the Croatian militias, which seem to be suffering from poor

conditions, especially in the regions of Kiseljuk, Busovaca, and Vitez, whose city center has now become visible.

In recent weeks, Bosnian fighters have made considerable progress around the capital, acknowledged by the official spokesman of the international forces in Sarajevo, though it has not been announced in its official media. Last week, the Serbs began a huge military campaign on several fronts, and met with devastating failure.

According to information AL-HAYAH obtained, there is a new attempt to break the siege around the capital, planned for a day and night some months ago, but awaiting the right moment for its implementation.

The arms and ammunition crisis is no longer the Bosnian army's worst problem; that is now the lack of the fuel necessary for aid and supply operations, which were halted after the outbreak of war between the Muslims and Croats. It had reached them through Croatian territory, causing them difficult problems, compelling Bosnian soldiers to march on foot from one point to another.

In spite of what the Muslims have suffered at Serbian and Croatian hands, there is a large sector of them who still believe that coexistence by the three communities is possible. There are still some Serbs and Croats who hold official posts, and sometimes high office, in these regions. Even so, Serb and Croat citizens living there are in no danger or threat of losing their jobs or homes, or of being rounded up as happened to Muslims in the regions occupied by Serbian or Croatian militias.

The trinity of war, hunger, and cold have imposed a high degree of social and economic solidarity on the Bosnian people, among individuals and whole cities. Basic goods

and commodities are bartered; Sarajevo, for example, sends flour to the cities of the central region, which in turn send meat to Sarajevo.

Some negative social phenomena, such as stealing and moral corruption, have, however, begun to appear on the surface, though they are still less than in other parts of the world afflicted with this kind of war.

This vital region of the country has gone through a considerable period of self-sufficiency in terms of foodstuffs, repairing the effects of war imposed by the Serbian militias, and cutting aid routes using the Croatian militias. Some villages are in no need of food aid, which was coming sporadically from the [High] Commission for Refugees and international aid agencies.

According to the new redistricting that the Bosnian Government has organized, the district of Zenta has come to include 14 municipalities in central Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a population of about 1 million, the overwhelming majority of whom are Muslims. They include six municipalities either totally or partially occupied by Serbian or Croatian militias.

Fuad Dzidic, recently appointed minister of this district by the Bosnian government as part of the system that divided the Muslims' areas into four (with a minister responsible for each), said, "We are proceeding with an ordered plan that we hope to complete to implement self-sufficiency, beginning with grains and vegetables." However, he thinks that the war going on in his region began before the Serbian and Croatian military invasion of it. "Iron and wood industries have been based in this region since the days of communist rule, plus coal and iron mines, causing a great deal of environmental pollution, which has negatively affected the volume of agricultural space in the region." He cited as an example a steel factory, the largest in former Yugoslavia, located in the center of the city of Zenica. It used to produce two million tons annually, without the use of any purifying filters. [passage omitted]

Croats, Serbs Extend Cease-Fire Until 30 Jan

*LD1301193694 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in
Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Jan 94*

[Text] Talks were held in the Karlovac suburb of Turanj today. The Croatian side was represented by General Petar Stipetic, commander of the Zagreb operational zone, Pavle Miljevac, commander of the Karlovac operational zone, Captain Davor Domazet, and Slavko Degoricija, chairman of the state commission for talks with rebel Serbs. The Serbian side was headed by Colonel Kosta Novakovic, while General (Met Guinness) attended the talks on behalf of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR]. A statement was issued after three hours of talks saying that the [Christmas] cease-fire [between Serbs and Croats in Croatia] was honored and that it has been extended until 31 January. The talks will be resumed at state commission level. It was concluded that expert military groups should be formed to prepare an agreement on a lasting truce.

Government Agrees To Pay Krsko Debt

*LD1301183794 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in
Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 13 Jan 94*

[Excerpts] At its session today, the Croatian Government examined the implementation of the second phase of the stabilization program, and the situation in Croatia's energy network in the light of certain misunderstandings as regards Krsko nuclear power plant. Among other things, it also examined the situation in Croatia's railways. [passage omitted]

One of the most important points on the agenda was entitled: the situation in Croatia's energy network. This referred mainly to certain cases of incomprehension and misunderstanding between the Slovene and Croatian

sides about the Krsko nuclear plant, and as regards an outstanding debt owed by the Croatian Electricity Board to the Krsko nuclear plant. However, this is only a pretext for some disagreements; the real reasons are of another nature. Minister of Industry Nadan Vidosevic said there will be no problem about paying the 40 million German mark debt. He added:

[Begin Vidosevic recording] The central issue is that we are demanding an interstate treaty, we want extremely clear and correct relations, and we are demanding the protection of 50 percent of our property, which according to some estimates is around \$1 billion. This is a huge sum which Croatia, acting as a responsible country, simply has to protect. That is the central issue.

I hold that we simply ought to protect our interests, and strictly abide by the standpoint that we will settle our financial obligations, but the Slovene side has to accept the drawing up of an interstate treaty; we must return to the framework of the 1970 agreement, according to which 19 Croats will go back to work [in the nuclear plant]. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Minister Says 6,700 Croats Released by Serbs

*LD1301162894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in
English 1303 GMT 13 Jan 94*

[Text] At today's session of the Croatian Government, its minister in charge of humanitarian affairs, Ivica Kostovic, spoke about the efforts Croatia has undertaken for the release of POW's from Serbia's detention camps. So far 6,700 Croats have been released, Kostovic said, and we trust the others will also be freed. He added that normal constructive negotiations on this issue conducted with the representatives of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had opened other possibilities of successful negotiations in the future.

Official Threatens 'Measures' Against Croatia

*AU1301190494 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in
Slovene 1430 GMT 13 Jan 94*

[Text] Minister of Economy Maks Tajnikar organized talks today on the problem regarding the seizure of electricity by the Croatian Electrical Power Generation Industry. Taking part in the talks were, among others, Energy Secretary Boris Sovic; Savo Trepse, duty official of the Slovene Electricity Board; and Ostož Kristan, director general of the Slovene Electricity Board. After the meeting, Jozė Skok interviewed Mr. Kristan:

[Begin recording] [Skok] Mr. Kristan, let us first ask the following question: Is neighboring Croatia, or more specifically, its electrical power generation industry, taking the electricity from our network into its system?

[Kristan] Well, the two systems are connected and they are synchronically operating [words indistinct]. After we had been told by the nuclear power plant that it is giving us the (?entire) power from the beginning of its operation after the repair, we have made the appropriate programs and sent them to our partners because it was [words indistinct] that they do not get energy from the (?nuclear power plant), certainly not this quantity. As of that time, they have been taking electricity as if one-half belongs to them, therefore they have not been respecting the (?schedule).

[Skok] Therefore, we can say that they have been (?taking the electricity) from the very beginning of the work of the nuclear power plant?

[Kristan] They are taking the electricity without unauthorized. We are registering this as deviation from the program of operation and are warning them every hour in written form, by a faxed message.

[Skok] What quantity, (?that is) for how long the Croatian Electrical Power Generation Industry is [words indistinct] unauthorized seizure of electricity?

[Kristan] That (?deviation) amounts to (?80) megawatts, which is approximately one-half of the production of the nuclear power plant. This is no technical problem for us, but is certainly a commercial, expense problem. A decision should be made certainly [words indistinct] their reaction. We are going to warn them tomorrow, [words indistinct] stand, to give us back this electricity next week. And if [words indistinct] in interstate relations, the programs will be changed. And if they refuse to give electricity back next week, that is, if that deviation

exceeds a bearable level we should certainly take measures with a view to protecting our reserves and our network [end recording]

Commentary Views Jansa Violation of Embargo

*AU1301182294 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in
Slovene 1430 GMT 12 Jan 94*

[Commentary by Janko Saradjen]

[Text] After Dusan Pozar, senior prosecutor in Maribor, has handed the material on the number of violations of Security Council resolutions on the part of Janez Jansa and the Defense Ministry—the material collected in the investigation of the arms affair—over to the Ljubljana Public Prosecutor Tomaz Miklavcic, some procedural processes should be explained. The Maribor prosecutor had to hand the case over to the Ljubljana prosecutor because the seat of the Defense Ministry is in Ljubljana. As we have learned, Tomaz Miklavcic has still not received the aggravating material, but when he does receive it he will assess whether it is ready for [word indistinct]. He has enough time for such an assessment, according to internal regulations, as he himself claims, up to six months. If he initiates further investigations, this period could be as long as four years, which applies to suspicion of an act punishable by up to one year in prison.

The public prosecutor's office is a hierarchically organized institution, and if the procedure lasts too long the senior Ljubljana prosecutor Pavle Dolenc may demand that the municipal prosecutor speed up the matter. In order to avoid that altogether, he may take over the matter himself. The republican public prosecutor, Anton Drobnic, may also intervene. The development of these events may, for some people, serve as another occasion to assess to what extent our state is based on the rule of law.

We do not know how quickly the Public Prosecutor's Office will react. On this occasion, let us recall that recently, in some other case, the Ljubljana public prosecutor reacted very quickly.

The question is of how the aggravating material reached the public before the Ljubljana public prosecutor received them. Is the Post Office alone to blame? We would have to have this in mind, for the Maribor prosecutor stated that we should certainly take care about the country's reputation abroad and make legal distinction between aid to victims of aggression and violations committed from gainful motives.

Federal**Defense Council Holds Session, Issues Statement***LD1301150494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1216 GMT 13 Jan 94*

[Text] Belgrade, 13 Jan (TANJUG)—A session of the Supreme Defense Council was held in Belgrade today under the chairmanship of FRY President Zoran Lilic, the Yugoslav president's military office has announced. In addition to members of the Supreme Defense Council—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic—the session was also attended by Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic, Federal Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic, and Lieutenant Colonel General Momcilo pereisic, the Yugoslav Army chief of the general staff.

The Supreme Defense Council discussed the financing of the Yugoslav Army and concluded that in 1994 priority should be given to securing the necessary financial resources to maintain the necessary level of combat readiness, and to improve the living standards of Yugoslav Army members, a statement by the Yugoslav president's military office says.

Akashi Hails 'Positive Stand' on UNPROFOR*LD1301234894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1851 GMT 13 Jan 94*

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 13 (TANJUG)—Yasushi Akashi, civilian head of the UN peace-keeping force in former Yugoslavia said Thursday [13 January] that he was encouraged by Yugoslavia's positive stand towards the problems faced by the UN Peacekeeping Forces (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia. We discussed bilateral issues and the Yugoslav Prime Minister Kontic adopted a positive stand towards the problems faced by UNPROFOR, the UN secretary-general's envoy told a press conference after his meeting with the Yugoslav prime minister in Belgrade.

Kontic on his part expressed his satisfaction that a man from Japan, country which has always led a principled policy towards the crisis in former Yugoslavia, had come to head the UNPROFOR. Akashi told Kontic that he was aware that some of the UN Security Council decisions had caused the suffering of the Yugoslav population which was all the more reason why solutions had to be found that would lead to their cancellation.

The United Nations had introduced sanctions against Yugoslavia in May 1992 because of its alleged involvement in the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, even though Yugoslavia has no troops in that republic. Akashi also informed Kontic that the Security Council sanctions committee had simplified the procedure for obtaining authorisations for food and medicine imports and that this procedure now took only a few days instead of weeks or months.

The Japanese diplomat also said that NATO had asked UNPROFOR to prepare a feasibility study on carrying out air strikes on Serb positions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the beginning of this week, NATO had threatened the Bosnian Serbs with air strikes in order to stop the bombing of Sarajevo, secure the opening of Tuzla airport and the relief of the UN Canadian contingent in Srebrenica, a Moslem enclave in east Bosnia-Herzegovina.

However, it is the Moslems who are responsible for the clashes in Sarajevo. According to the UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina General Francis Briquemont, they launched unprovoked attacks on Serb suburbs in Sarajevo on Tuesday. The Bosnian Serbs think that the opening of the Tuzla airport is not possible before the Moslem side signs a peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina because they fear that the Moslems would use the Tuzla airport, just like they did the Sarajevo airport, for the contraband of arms for their army.

Bosnian Serb leaders also said that their forces were not besieging the UNPROFOR Canadian battalion in Srebrenica and that their request to be freed is unfounded. Akashi said that UNPROFOR had still not completed the feasibility study on the air strikes, adding that he was leaving for Geneva on Sunday to meet the UN Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali. Akashi said that he was responsible for the territory of the former Yugoslav republics and that he would help the negotiators as much as he could because they would rely on on-ground information. He expressed hope that this information would help and contribute to reaching positive results.

Akashi 'Encouraged' By Talks*AU1301150794 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 13 Jan 94*

[Text] We have just received a report that Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic received Yasushi Akashi, special envoy of the UN Secretary General for the former Yugoslavia and a new head of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] for Yugoslavia. After the talks, which were held behind closed doors, Akashi briefly addressed journalists, telling them that he and Kontic discussed the declaration issued at the NATO summit, which asks UNPROFOR to study the possibilities of protecting Srebrenica and Tuzla airport. Akashi announced that he will go to Geneva to meet Secretary General Butrus-Ghali and hold consultations on these issues. He explained that he and Thorvald Stoltenberg will have different obligations and that he will stay on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

I will help the negotiators in Geneva as much as I can. They will rely on the information that I will send them from the field. I think that this will help, and hope that it will bring about positive results sooner, Akashi said. Prime Minister Kontic and I discussed bilateral relations between the Yugoslav Government and UNPROFOR, and must say that I am quite encouraged by his views, Akashi told journalists.

Serbia

Milosevic: Bombing Threats 'Incomprehensible'

LD1301195594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1651 GMT 13 Jan 94

[Text] Belgrade, 13 Jan (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received Yasushi Akashi, the UN secretary general's special envoy for the former Yugoslavia. They discussed the main issues of the Yugoslav crisis and the situation in former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

President Milosevic stressed that the Serbian side has complied with the European Union's [EU] demands to provide 33 percent of the territory [of Bosnia-Herzegovina] for the Muslim republic. He also stressed that the signing of the peace agreement between the warring sides in the region depends only on the Muslim leadership in Sarajevo.

The Serb side in the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina has not waged war for more than seven months now, and the responsibility for the current armed provocations undoubtedly lies with the Muslim leadership in Sarajevo. Therefore, President Milosevic stressed, the threats of bombing the Serb side are incomprehensible. They encourage the Muslim leadership to prolong the war and avoid once more the signing of the peace agreement, which undermines the efforts invested in the peace process so far.

According to the assessment of the Republic of Serbia, it would be much more useful for international factors to exert pressure on the Muslim leadership to accept the peace plan for former Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereby peace would be given preference over war.

President Milosevic told Akashi that the Republic of Serbia will continue helping to establish a just and lasting peace in former Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the same time working on the removal of one-sided assessments by international factors which help the war-mongers among the Muslim leaders hold on to their illusions that they will achieve their goals through war.

Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic also took part in the talks.

Some SPO Members Hope To Found 'New' Depos

AU1301181794 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jan 94 p 4

[Report by C. M.: "Another Depos in the Play?"]

[Text] As BORBA has unofficially learned from sources close to the leadership of the Serbian Renewal Movement, some of the membership would like to try to "enliven" the work of Depos [Democratic Movement of Serbia], but a Depos essentially different from the one that exists at present. In addition to the Serbian Renewal

Movement and the unaffiliated members from the original Depos, the new Depos would also have place for the Democratic Party (the section that supports Zoran Djindjic), the Democratic Party of Serbia, and the Peasant Party of Milomir Babic.

Sandzak SDA Rejects Proposal on Bosnia

AU1301155894 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 13 Jan 94

[Report by Bisera Vukasinovic]

[Text] The Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak held a news conference in Novi Pazar today. Party Secretary Rasim Ljajic spoke about the latest Croatian proposal for the settlement of the Muslim issue in Bosnia and the NATO declaration. Bisera Vukasinovic reports:

[Vukasinovic] Tudjman's initiative for a confederation with the Muslim state in Bosnia is not a serious proposal. The initiative is hiding the desire to divert attention from the Croatian aggression in Bosnia and avoid talks on Muslim access to the sea, and at the same time to score new points with the international community, Rasim Ljajic said. The frivolousness of the proposal is illustrated by the fact that a similar proposal by the Muslim side on the creation of a joint republic was rejected three months ago, he said.

Commenting on the NATO summit, Rasim Ljajic said that the session did not produce anything new, and that the threats with bombing are seen to be more of pressure on the Serbian side than a real possibility. Rasim Ljajic devoted most part of his news conference to the situation in this region. He accused members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of carrying out searches of villages in Pester and taking in about 1,500 Muslims for informative talks. He described this as a planned and long-term strategy aimed at changing the demographic structure of the population. We asked to be received by the head of the Secretariat for Internal Affairs in Novi Pazar and [Interior] Minister Sokolovic to discuss the brutal conduct by the police, but our request fell on deaf ears, said Rasim Ljajic, secretary of the Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak, at the news conference in Novi Pazar.

Macedonia

Gligorov Wants 'Urgent Meeting' With Papandreou

BR1401104794 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 14 Jan 94 p 14

[Report by Guido Rampoldi: "President Says To Papandreou: 'Let Us Meet Soon'"]

[Text] Skopje—Macedonia President Kiro Gligorov has launched an appeal, through LA REPUBBLICA, to Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou to hold an urgent meeting to initiate negotiations: "I am prepared

to meet with him at any time. Dialogue is the only reasonable prospect for resolving all the pending issues, otherwise the crisis will worsen and we risk following the tendency toward chaos that has emerged in the Balkans. I believe that we will be able to find a good solution to all the issues dividing us, either by resolving them one by one, or with a package of comprehensive measures." To do this "it is necessary to have a different attitude, as well as the awareness that propaganda and emotionalism harm both parties." Gligorov, along with Bosnian [President] Izetbegovic, was behind the last attempt to save some sort of Yugoslavia (June 1991), which was sabotaged by Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia. Home to a minuscule Serb minority, Macedonia has so far escaped the fate of Bosnia. Nevertheless, we asked him what would happen to a multiethnic (Slav and Albanian) Macedonia if Bosnia too were divided along ethnic lines. He was keen to confirm that Macedonia was different, in that it had a secular tradition of Slav-Albanian cohabitation. So what about the paramilitary network of Albanian separatists discovered in December, along with weapons and a list of 20,000 names? "An isolated incident," Gligorov also thinks that it is "impossible" that Serbia and Albanians from Tirana or Kosovo would settle their territorial quarrels in the same way that Belgrade and Zagreb tried to resolve the Krajina question: i.e., by devouring a third state (in that case Bosnia, in this case Macedonia). Indeed, he is convinced that, despite certain unfavorable prognoses that have appeared in the press (some of which are attributed to the CIA), "there is a prevailing awareness that stability in Macedonia is a condition for peace in the Balkans." For this reason, the United States will also recognize Macedonia.

PDP Committee Hold 'Fruitless' Negotiations

AU1401073294 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 13 Jan 94 p 4

[*"P.Dz."*-initialed report: "Will Taci Create a Party?"]

[Text] The PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] Congress Preparatory Committee, acting as the temporary leadership of this party has, as we have discovered, definitely given up negotiations with the "hard current," headed by Menduh Taci. The fruitless attempts to find a compromise with Taci, who proclaimed the leadership illegitimate at the Gostivar meeting last month, have, after all, been the elementary reasons for the repeated

postponement of the congress, announced for 15 January. The efforts for a compromise between the two currents (the Committee and the "hard current") have, as a matter of fact, been urged by the Kosovo Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova. The idea was to fuse the Committee and the commission composed of members of the "Gostivar meeting" into a new body, which would then be in charge of the preparations for the Congress. For that purpose mediators from the Coordinating Board of Albanian parties (in former Yugoslavia) were elected. However, the meeting in Pristina two days ago ended without success, because representatives of the "Gostivar meeting" did not arrive. This was stated in the report signed by the Pristina mediators Femi Agani, Izmi Islami, and Riza Halimi. Thus, it seems that these negotiations have ended, nevertheless, well-informed sources claim that the Taci group is proceeding with its contacts with Tirana. A delegation of this group, headed by Aliriza Loga, paid another visit to its "sponsors," as our sources said, and recently "a new envoy from Albania" visited Debar [Macedonia]. It is even claimed that the Taci group is not very interested in the congress, because it intends to form its own party. The assemblies of the Tetovo, Gostivar, and Struga branches have not taken place (it is a precondition for the congress) and they are expected to be held by the end of this week. If that happens, the congress could be postponed for a week or two. The Congress Preparatory Committee has to put forward presidential candidates for the PDP. As we have stated several times, delegate Abdurahman Aliti, vice chairman of the Macedonian People's Assembly Djeladin Murati, and head of the PDP delegate group Muhamed Halili were mentioned as candidates for this function.

Japanese Delegation Assessing Investment Plans

LD1301144694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1132 GMT 13 Jan 94

[Text] Skopje, 13 Jan (Tanjug)—A delegation of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by Shunji Yanai, director general of the Foreign Policy Bureau, is visiting Skopje today. According to a statement by the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] Command for Macedonia, the Japanese delegation will meet with representatives of the Macedonian Government and will also visit UNPROFOR members at an observation point near Tabanovci. The Japanese delegation is visiting Macedonia as part of its fact-finding tour of the former Yugoslav republics, on the basis of which it will decide on possible financial investments.

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